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"Assume a Rather Large Boat . . ":
The Mess We Have Made of
Partnership Law
Allan W. Vestal*
There was a fear, there is a fear, there always will be a fear, that highly
productive partners.. . can leave, go to another place and get more money.
And life is not made up of love, it is made up of fear and greed and money -
how much you get paid in large measure. Unless we didn't get Cadwalader's
profitability to where it was with our competitors' firms, my great fear was that
people were going to leave and that we would then not be able to sustain
ourselves.
- John Fritts, Esq., Co-Chair, Management Committee
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft
Co-partners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues the duty
of finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
- Chief Justice Benjamin Cardozo
Meinhard v. Salmon2
[Wrongfully ousted former partner] James W. Beasley, shall recover from
the Defendant, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, damages in the amount of
$2,487,502.00, for which let execution issue.
- Judge Jack H. Cook
Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft
3
* Associate Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law. The assistance
of the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University, is gratefully acknowledged.
I would like to thank Randy Bezanson, Bill Callison, Keith Engel, Art Goldsmith, Bob
Hillman, David Millon, Larry Mitchell, Barry Sullivan, Brenda Vestal, and Don Weidner for
their helpful comments. I would also like to thank my research assistants Mara Leiding and
Kathy Suh for their valuable contributions. This Article is based on an address presented at
the Washington and Lee University School of Law on November 15, 1996, in connection with
The Future of the Unincorporated Firm Symposium.
1. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL
438777, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996) (quoting deposition of John Fritts at 95, 11. 10-25,
docket no. 132).
2. Id. at *5 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo,
C.J.)).
3. Id. at *9. The award was subsequently increased to $3,647,011.17. See infra note
33. The case is on appeal. See infra note 34.
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Introduction
In several ways, the ruling in Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham &
Taft measures our collective failure with respect to partnership law. One
measure of our failure is that popular support of the traditional norms of
partner behavior has eroded to such an extent that the managers of a part-
nership, a leading law firm no less, might have assumed the behavior
chronicled by the court was acceptable.
It is another measure of failure that the outcome of Cadwalader under
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) and its progeny would be far
from certain, both because RUPA reflects the erosion of the traditional
norms and because RUPA does not fully implement either the traditional
structure or the competing philosophy, but represents an uneasy and un-
workable compromise between the two.
It is a further measure of failure that although the group of knowledge-
able commentators assembled for this Symposium would probably agree as
to how a client could best arrange its affairs to avoid the situation in which
the Cadwalader firm and James Beasley found themselves, there is no
agreement as to whether the new structures are justified on the basis of any
well-articulated policy.
It is also a measure of failure that we are seeing a breakdown in
uniformity of the law of unincorporated firms. Such a breakdown is not
directly involved in Cadwalader, to be sure, but the breakdown does
promise to make situations such as that in Cadwalader more likely in the
future because it gives a new means for partners acting in bad faith to
attempt to avoid their fiduciary duties.
Cadwalader measures our failure the largest in the loss of any consen-
sus as to what the law ought to be. Behind advocates' arguments over the
application of the existing or emerging law, and behind disputes over new
forms and uniformity within forms, we have abandoned the historical
consensus on the theory of partnership law without having any consensus
with which to replace it. We have discarded historical assumptions about
the nature of partnership law, the importance of personal responsibility as
reflected in the liability of general partners, and the desirability of uniform
laws. And that abandonment of shared assumptions is the root cause of our
failure and the resulting mess we have made of the law of the unincor-
porated firm.
THE MESS WE HAVE MADE OF PARTNERSHIP LAW
L The Case: Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft
Cadwalader itself is interesting, and merits a short introduction.4
From his lateral entry in 1989, James Beasley was a partner, "an extraordi-
nary rainmaker and a skilled litigator, '" in the Palm Beach office of
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, which bills itself as the oldest law
partnership in the United States.' In 1993, the share value of the Cad-
walader firm declined, and concern among some partners resulted in a
substantial change in the composition of the management committee.7 Also
in 1993, the Palm Beach office operated at a loss for the first time since
Beasley's arrival.' The year 1994 saw an even larger decline in Cadwal-
ader's share value.9 A group of some fifteen "younger, more productive
partners"'0 became upset at the compensation situation and pressed the
management committee for action." The management committee and the
insurgents cooperated in an exercise, "Project Right Size," which "was
aimed at identifying less productive partners for elimination from the
partnership. "12 The status of the Palm Beach office became part of Project
Right Size, "with the common purpose being to improve compensation to
the remaining partners and to retain the disgruntled more productive part-
ners."13
Confidential firm information was used to generate secret computer
models of a downsized firm.14 Events ran their course:
4. Except as noted, these facts are excerpted from "The Facts" section of Judge
Cook's opinion. See Cadwalader, 1996 WL 438777, at *1-*3. Dean Donald Weidner
presents a contrasting analysis of Cadwalader and RUPA. Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader,
RUPA and Fiduciary Duty, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 1997).
5. Cadwalader, 1996 WL 438777, at *1.
6. Id. There is some irony here, evident in the managing partner's acknowledgment
that: "The partnership is technically dissolved every time a partner leaves .... ." Amy
Stevens, Prestigious Law Firm Gets Sued by a Partner It Would Not Keep, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 11, 1994, at BI (quoting John Fritts, management committee co-chair).
7. A detailed account of the internal politics appeared in the popular legal press. See
Vera Titunik, The Rising Sons, AM. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 78, 78-83.
8. Cadwalader, 1996 WL 438777, at *1.





14. Id. At the instigation of a partner who was both a member of the management
committee and the insurgent group, "numerous computer runs were generated.., analyzing
the financial impact of terminating from ten to thirty partners." Id. These computer runs
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The watershed of the project was a clandestine all day management
committee meeting . . . . Prior to the meeting, Co-chair Donald
Glascoff had asked all management committee members to submit lists
of less productive partners for discussion as to possible termination.
Only five of the twelve members chose to submit such a list.... All
of the Florida partners appeared on at least three lists and one appeared
on all five. The . . . meeting resulted in seventeen partners being
identified for expulsion from the partnership, including all of the Florida
partners. 
5
The management committee voted to go forward with Project Right Size. 6
The day after the management committee decided to close the Palm
Beach office, the firm notified the Florida partners." Reportedly, the Flor-
ida partners were asked to voluntarily withdraw in exchange for a return of
their capital contributions and three months' severance.'" All refused, and
thereafter the firm posted an armed guard at the Palm Beach office to
protect its property. 9
Negotiations with Beasley over the terms of his separation from the
firm broke down, and litigation ensued.' Beasley advanced two substantive
claims against the partnership: that he was expelled from the partnership in
violation of the firm's partnership agreement, and that the firm's actions
violated its fiduciary duty owed to him. He also advanced a claim for puni-
tive damages.
were kept from the partnership generally, but were shared with at least one other member
of the insurgents.
15. Id.
16. Id. at *2-*3. The clandestine meeting was held on August 7, 1994. Id. at
*2. The final management committee vote to close the Florida office was taken on August
29, 1994. Id. The Florida partners were told of the closure of the Florida office on August
30, 1994; the remaining partners were informed of the decision on August 31, 1994. Id.
at *3.
17. Id. at *3.
18. Stevens, supra note 6, at B1
19. Id.
20. Cadwalader, 1996 WL 438777, at *3. Early in September, a representative of the
management committee went to Palm Beach to discuss the future of the Palm Beach
partners. Id. He agreed with James Beasley that in Beasley's case a transfer to New York
would be impracticable. Id. Through September, October, and early November, Beasley
negotiated with the management committee on the terms of his departure. Id. Negotiations
broke down, and on November 10, 1994, Beasley filed suit. Id. The next day, "the co-
chairs of the firm ousted Beasley from the firm offices by letter, although his actual
departure was delayed by a series of agreements until November 17, 1994." Id.
490
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A. Expulsion as Violation of Firm Partnership Agreement
Remarkably, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft had no provision in its
partnership agreement for the expulsion of a partner.2 There being no
statutory provision allowing the expulsion, the court determined that Beas-
ley was expelled and the partnership agreement breached.'
B. Breaches of Fiduciary Duty
Beasley advanced three fiduciary duty claims: (i) that the firm expelled
him in contravention of the partnership agreement, (ii) that the firm failed
to disclose the plans to close the Palm Beach office and terminate its
partners, and (iii) that the motivation for the expulsion was the financial
gain of the remaining partners.' Judge Cook found a breach of fiduciary
duty, apparently based on the third component of Beasley's claim.' After
21. Id. at *7. Judge Cook found that the partnership agreement contained no expul-
sion clause, that the management committee had a "legal memorandum which told them that
they did not have the authority to expel partners," that the management committee members
had not read the partnership agreement to see if it allowed them to expel a partner, and that
the management committee did not consult its in-house experts on partnership law on the
question of their power to expel a partner. Id. Professor Hillman reports that expulsion
clauses are common in written law firm partnership agreements, but that comprehensive
clauses are rare. ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW AND
ETIfcs OF PARTNER WITHDRAwALS AND LAW FIRM BREAKUPS § 5.3.2., at 5:7 (1996).
The partnership agreement for the White & Case firm did not contain an express
termination provision either, leading to their collusive dissolution case involving a former
partner. Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589, 592 (N.Y. 1996). In contrast, the
partnership agreement of the Pillsbury Madison & Sutro firm recently withstood a challenge
to its expulsion provisions. Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336,
346-48 (Ct. App. 1996).
22. Cadwalader, 1996 WL 438777, at *5. Cadwalader argued that Beasley voluntarily
withdrew. Id. at *3-*4. The firm claimed that the management committee didn't expel
Beasley, it merely closed the Palm Beach office and offered to transfer Beasley to New
York. Id. The court found that Cadwalader's offer to move Beasley to New York "was not
a good faith offer of continued partnership," and that even had the offer been made in good
faith, Beasley's rejection of the offer would not constitute a voluntary withdrawal from the
partnership. Id. at *4. Judge Cook also found that the filing of Beasley's suit against the
firm did not constitute a voluntary withdrawal. Id.
Having rejected Cadwalader's defenses, the court found that Beasley was wrongfilly
expelled from the partnership in two ways: "[Tihe management committee's action in
deciding to terminate the Florida partners and to close the Florida office constituted an antic-
ipatory breach of the partnership agreement," and "Beasley was expelled by the letter of
November 11, 1994 [ousting Beasley from the firm offices after he filed suit]." Id. at *5.
23. Id. at *5.
24. Id. at *5-*6. Judge Cook was not clear as to whether Beasley could have pre-
vailed on the fiduciary duty claim without first prevailing on the partnership agreement
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citing Meinhard v. Salmon as "[t]he point of beginning and perhaps ending
for an analysis of partnership fiduciary duty within the State of New
York,"' the court distinguished the case of Day v. Sidley & Austin.26
Judge Cook then noted that the Cadwalader partnership agreement contained
a provision allowing amendments to the partnership agreement by a less
than unanimous vote of the partners. "However," the court stated, "the
management committee chose not to follow this route, but rather, appar-
ently for the sake of expediency, to bend to the will of the disgruntled
partners by expelling others to whom they owed a fiduciary duty. '"I
Looking to the lack of an expulsion mechanism in the partnership agree-
ment and the failure to amend the partnership agreement to create an
expulsion mechanism prior to the expulsion of Beasley, the court declared:
These facts compel the conclusion that the management committee
breached its fiduciary duty to Beasley. This was not a situation where
the management committee was merely fulfilling its management func-
tion. Rather, it was participating in a clandestine plan to wrongfully
expel some partners for the financial gain of other partners. Such activ-
ity cannot be said to be honorable, much less to comport with "the
punctilio of an honor."'
claim. Certainly the opinion permits the inference that the partnership agreement breach
was a central element of the fiduciary duty breach. Judge Cook stated that:
These facts compel the conclusion that the management committee breached
its' fiduciary duty to Beasley. This was not a situation where the management
committee was merely fulfilling its' [sic] management function. Rather, it was
participating in a clandestine plan to wrongfully expel some partners for the
financial gain of other partners. Such activity cannot be said to be honorable,
much less to comport with "the punctilio of an honor."
Id. at *6. But it is also true that there is nothing in the analysis that would preclude a
finding for Beasley on the fiduciary duty claim even had the partnership agreement permitted
the expulsion of a partner. Such a fact would simply have shifted the inquiry to whether
it is a violation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty or the fiduciary obligation of good faith to
use such a mechanism in the partnership agreement to target individual partners for the
benefit of other individual partners. So presented, the question would become whether the
existence of a partnership agreement expulsion provision would transform such an activity
"to be honorable, much less to comport with 'the punctilio of an honor.'" Id.
25. Id. at *5 (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928)).
26. Id. (citing Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). The
defendant had apparently cited Sidley & Austin "for the proposition that there is no breach
of fiduciary duty when a partner is affected by a management committee decision." Id. at
*5. Judge Cook distinguished Sidley & Austin on the facts. Id. at *5-*6.
27. Id. at *6.
28. Id. Thus, the court rejected the firm's affirmative defense. Id. The court found
that Beasley was planning to leave the firm, that he had entered into discussions with some
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C. Claim for Punitive Damages
Beasley based his punitive damages on Cadwalader's breach of fidu-
ciary duty. Judge Cook's analysis went to two aspects of the Cadwalader
management committee's conduct in expelling Beasley: the manner in which
the management committee disregarded Beasley's rights and the underlying
reason for the expulsion. As to the manner of the expulsion, the court
looked to the absence of a partner expulsion provision in the partnership
agreement, the clear meaning of the partnership agreement coupled with the
memorandum on point that the management committee had received, the
failure of members of the management committee even to read the relevant
portions of the partnership agreement, and the failure of the management
committee to consult its own experts on partnership law. 9 As to motive,
the court found that "[t]he expulsion was for the express purpose of increas-
ing the compensation available to the other partners.""
After contrasting managing partner Fritts's deposition endorsement of
"fear and greed and money" with Justice Cardozo's declarations in
Meinhard v. Salmon,3' Judge Cook made the predicate finding for an award
of punitive damages:
Under the facts of this case, it was a gross breach of fiduciary duty for
some partners to throw others overboard for the expediency of increased
profits. I find that these facts establish at least conduct which was so
reckless as to amount to a conscious disregard for the rights of Beasley
and the other expelled partners.'
Judge Cook awarded James Beasley $2,038,763.25 in actual damages,
$500,000.00 in punitive damages, $1,075,749.94 in attorney and expert
witness fees, and $32,497.98 in costs for a total award of $3,647,011.17.
associates, and that he had not disclosed these discussions to the other partners. Id. Judge
Cook found that these actions did not constitute a breach of Beasley's fiduciary duty to the
firm and that even if Beasley's conduct did constitute such a breach it would not be suffi-
cient to defeat his claims: "It would not be equitable to allow Beasley's actions in this regard
to stand as a defense to Cadwalader's much more egregious conduct. If Beasley had dirt
under his fingernails, CW&T was up to its elbows in the dung heap." Id.




33. Beasley was awarded $2,487,502 in damages on July 23, 1996: $236,392 for his
various accounts, $867,110 for his interest in the firm on the date of expulsion, $884,000
for the profits attributable to the use of his rights to the partnership property from the date
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Both sides are appealing the ruling.'
HI. Cadwalader Under the UPA: Correct and Predictable
Cadwalader would be unremarkable if it merely stood for the proposi-
tion that, under the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) and the common law,
a group of partners cannot expel one of their partners when the partnership
agreement has no expulsion provision - that such partners must either
amend the partnership agreement or dissolve the partnership.35 The case is
notable because of the juxtaposition of the attitudes and behavior of those
in control of the partnership with Chief Justice Cardozo's rhetoric in
Meinhard v. Salmon, and because of the apparent utter disregard of those
partners in control for any sense of fiduciary duty. 6
of his wrongful expulsion to the date of the court's order, and $500,000 in punitive dam-
ages. Id. at *8. Beasley did not receive an award for future lost income, because the court
found that the greater weight of the evidence was that Beasley would not have continued as
a partner at the firn past 1994. Id. The court reserved jurisdiction to make further awards
of prejudgment interest and costs. Id. at *9. On October, 17, 1996, the court awarded
Beasley an additional $931,600 in attorney fees and $144,149.94 in expert witness fees, and
the court reserved plaintiff's claim for $66,698.56 in taxable costs and disbursements
pending further hearings. See Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Tax Costs and Attorney's
Fees, Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," at 10-11 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Oct. 17, 1996). On December 17, 1996, the court awarded Beasley $32,497.98
in costs, and on January 16, 1997, the court awarded Beasley an additional $51,261.25 in
actual damages to account for Beasley's share of the firm income from May 30, 1996 to
July 23, 1996. See Amendment to Final Judgment, Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham
& Taft, CL-94-8646 "AJ," at 1-2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 17, 1997).
34. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL
438777, appealfiled, No. 96-02805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 1996) (defendants' appeal
notice); Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL
438777, appealfiled, No. 96-02805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 1996) (plaintiff's appeal
notice).
35. The leading authority on law firm breakups makes the same point: "'It's more than
a contract case,' says Robert Hillman .... 'People shouldn't take comfort in the fact that
it is about an expulsion clause. There is a lot of language in that opinion about how
partners are supposed to treat each other. I think it's going to be a very important case.'"
Karen Dillon, The Cadwalader Paradox, AM. LAW., Sept. 1996, at 7, 8; see also Dawson
v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589, 591-92 (N.Y. 1996).
36. Indeed, the managing partners cast the decisions as being nothing special: "Donald
Glascoff, co-chairm[a]n of the firm's managing committee, said, 'If you don't make business
decisions, you don't have a law practice.'" Beth Reinhard, P.B. Lawyer Sues Firm over
Firing, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 16, 1994, at 6B. The inherent conceptual difficulty in
expelling a partner from a partnership is not lost on thoughtful commentators: "On a
fundamental level, a tension exists between removing a partner for reasons other than
misconduct and the partner's status as a co-owner of the firm." HILLMAN, supra note 21,
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One is struck by the almost adolescent bravado of the insurgents in
their reported statements. The first crisis faced by the insurgents was how
to deal with the well-entrenched chair of the firm, Rodney Dayan. At issue
were compensation credits for client originations:
"We controlled a lot of business," but didn't get credit for it, claims
[Robert] Link .... "Rod's view was, 'Leave the client contact credit
with me, and I'll take care of you.'"
Link... and others, however, wanted to take care of themselves
and began to agitate for a voice in the firm. Link... would bash
around ideas with Chris White several times a week on the squash courts
at the Downtown Athletic Club. They would go back to Cadwalader's
offices on Maiden Lane and talk to others ... and especially with...
Holland West.
West, White and Link are among the hardest workers in the
firm.... So it's not surprising that they turned their sights on partners
who didn't bill or hustle at the same pace.'
The insurgents approached Dayan about getting a voice on the management
committee:
"Rod was receptive to our desires," says [Karsten] Giesecke, but made
no promises .... Although [the slate prepared by Dayan] included a
few reform-minded partners, those seeking change still felt jilted. "That
was Rod's downfall," asserts Link. "He didn't talk to me or anything.
It was a miscalculation." 3
Dayan's miscalculation cost him leadership of the firm; he was ousted from
the management committee in the elections. Having ousted Dayan, the
insurgents tried to manage the firm. Continued dissatisfaction on the issue
of compensation forced the management committee members to turn their
sights on the partners seen as less productive. It was "do-or-die time"39
when those in control had to make "gut-wrenching"'' " decisions to make the
firm into "a sleeker, more efficient, well-oiled machine."4"
The insurgents deny they were motivated by greed:
"It's not about younger people trying to put money in their pocket," Link
says. "If it was about that, we would have left several years ago." ...
§ 5.1, at 5:2.
37. Titunik, supra note 7, at 80.
38. Id. at 81.
39. Id. at 79 (quoting John Fritts).
40. Id. (quoting unidentified management committee member).
41. Id. (quoting M. Holland West).
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[Plartners with portable business maintain that if money had been the
only thing on their minds, they could have abandoned ship. Instead, they
pride themselves on their willingness to stick with each other and the
firm, even when it meant making unpleasant decisions. "It's much
harder to stay and slug it out and make it work," says West.4'
They cast the change in terms of an exciting rite of passage:
"Like a young kid just learning to walk," is how 44-year-old real estate
partner W. Christopher White, a key management committee member,
describes the new generation running the firm. "You're a little unsure
of yourself, but then you find out not only can you walk, you can run."3
Let us then stipulate that in Cadwalader the actions of the insurgents
and their fellow-travelers on the management committee confirm the obser-
vation that, "[m]ore often than not, as baby boomers get into law firm
management, they tend to be thugs."I The surprise in Cadwalader, how-
ever, seems not that insurgents and managing partners were thugs (to adopt
the parlance of the observation), it is that they were such witless thugs.
They seem to have either missed the danger into which they were leading
the firm,4" or to have seen the danger and thought the risk appropriate. '
42. Id. at 81.
43. Id. at 80.
44. Barry Sullivan, Professions of Law, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 1235, 1244 n.32
(1996) (quoting Deborah Graham, Coming of Age: Having Forever Changed the Profession
by Their Numbers and Diversity, Baby Boomers Can Look Forward to Running Their Firms
and Even (Gasp) Retirement, 82 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 50, 54-55 (quoting Chicago-based
legal consultant Joel Henning, who further observes: "They want it all and they want it
now.")). For the record, John Fritts was reported in the spring of 1996 to be 61 years of
age, not a baby boomer. Titunik, supra note 7, at 79. The other two members of the three-
person executive committee were reported to be Robert Link, Jr., 41, and Karsten Giesecke,
45. Id. Also mentioned in the article are M. Holland West, 43 ("one of the upstarts") and
W. Christopher White, 44 ("a key management committee member"). Id. at 79-80.
45. One executive committee member evidenced a remarkable disdain for the fiduciary
claims: "John Fritts ... was quoted as calling Beasley's lawsuit frivolous. . . . 'That's
a bit of foolishness,' he said. 'The partnership is technically dissolved every time a partner
leaves, and nothing happens. It's a paper, legalistic transaction and has none of the
consequences he alludes to." Watch on the Media, LIABILITY WK., Nov. 21, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Newsletter database.
46. After Judge Cook's decision, the same member of the executive committee cast
the claim as simply a cost of doing business:
The closing of the Palm Beach office was a sound strategic decision. Such
decisions carry the possibility of lawsuits much like the one brought by Jim
Beasley, and we accepted that fact in our decision-making process.
Dillon, supra note 35, at 8 (quoting prepared statement of John Fritts).
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Of course, the behavior of the management committee is not surprising at
all if one believes that the abandonment of the moral foundation of fiduciary
law has serious social consequences. 47
Although the matter is on appeal, and thus final evaluations are
impossible, Judge Cook's core analysis in Cadwalader is solid; his reason-
ing seems debatable only on the margins or on issues not raised by the facts
in that situation. As to the finding that Beasley was expelled from the
partnership in violation of the partnership agreement, the analysis is
sound.' Beyond any doubt, the UPA allows partnership agreements to
provide a mechanism for the expulsion of a partner.49 But the Cadwalader
partnership agreement did not contain such an expulsion provision.' In
dictum, Judge Cook indicated that the partners could have adopted such an
expulsion provision and then expelled the targeted partners:
There was a way for CW&T to address the problem of profitability
and the presence of too many unproductive partners.... That was to
present the problem to the partnership with a proposed amendment to the
partnership agreement providing for the expulsion of partners. This
could have been done pursuant to paragraph "0" of the partnership
agreement. However, the management committee chose not to follow
this route, but rather, apparently for the sake of expediency, to bend to
the will of the disgruntled partners by expelling others to whom they
owed a fiduciary duty."1
47. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138
U. PA. L. REv. 1675, 1729-31 (1990).
48. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Judge Cook was incorrect in his find-
ing that "it is clear that the management committee had the power to close a branch office
as part of its overall managerial authority." Cadwalader, 1996 WL 438777, at *4. A
management committee certainly could be given such power. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT
(1914) (UPA) § 18(e), (h), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995). But such a conclusion does not end the
inquiry. The Judge's analysis seems correct that James Beasley did not voluntarily withdraw
by virtue of either his rejection of the bad faith relocation offer or his initiation of litigation.
49. UPA § 31()(d) ("Dissolution is caused ... [w]ithout violation of the agreement
between the partners ... [b]y the expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in
accordance with such a power conferred by the agreement between the partners .... ");
UPA § 38(1) ("If dissolution is caused by expulsion of a partner, bona fide under the
partnership agreement and if the expelled partner is discharged from all partnership liabili-
ties, either by payment or agreement under section 36(2), he shall receive in cash only the
net amount due him from the partnership."); UPA § 41(6) ("When a partner is expelled and
the remaining partners continue the business either alone or with others, without liquidation
of the partnership affairs, creditors of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the
person or partnership continuing the business.").
50. Cadwalader, 1996 WL 438777, at *3.
51. Id. at *6.
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Assuming that the partnership agreement contained a provision for the less-
than-unanimous amendment of the partnership agreement, 52 there is still the
question of whether the majority could so amend the partnership agreement
as part of a single plan that included the expulsion of certain partners,
without violating the fiduciary duty of good faith.' Professor Hillman
finds that there is not much authority on point, but notes that "there is
authority indicating a partnership may not by means of expulsion gain an
undue advantage over one of its members."' But, of course, in Cad-
52. The agreement can include such a provision. UPA § 18(h) ("The rights and duties
of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement
between them, by the following rules: ... [N]o act in contravention of any agreement between
the partners may be done rightfully without the consent of all the partners.") (emphasis added);
see HILLMAN, supra note 21, § 5.2, at 5:2-5:3 (noting that "expulsion pursuant to expulsion
provisions in the partnership agreement" is one means of partner expulsion).
53. Professor Hillman does cite a case in which the partners used a less-than-unanimous
amendment procedure to put in place an expulsion mechanism that was then used to expel a
targeted partner. HILLMAN, supra note 21, § 5.3.2., at 5:6 n.10 (citing Aztec Petroleum
Corp. v. MUM Co., 703 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tex. App. 1985, no writ)). But the Aztec court
was apparently not presented with a breach of good faith claim.
Beyond question, the partners had one way out, although the question of whether it would
violate their duties of loyalty and good faith is unanswered. It appears that Cadwalader was
a partnership at will, and as such, any of the partners, including any of the insurgents, could
have dissolved the partnership at any time. UPA § 31(1)(b). Of course such a dissolution
would simply trigger the winding up process. UPA § 30. The partners other than Beasley
have no right to continue the business without him. UPA Section 38(2)(b) does not work
because Beasley has not wrongfully dissolved; UPA Section 41(1) does not work because
Beasley has not retired; UPA Section 41(2) does not work because Beasley has not retired;
UPA Section 41(3) does not work because Beasley has neither retired nor died; UPA Section
41(5) does not work because Beasley has not wrongfully dissolved; and UPA Section 41(6)
does not work because Beasley has not been expelled. And Beasley, as a partner who has not
caused a wrongful dissolution of the partnership, has a right to participate in the winding up
process. UPA § 37. If the dissolution was done in contemplation of a midnight bulk sale of
the firm assets, even for a reasonable price, the participation of Beasley would likely prove
to be a substantial complication:
When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contravention of the partnership
agreement, each partner, as against his co-partners and all persons claiming through
them in respect of their interests in the partnership, unless otherwise agreed, may
have the partnership property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus
applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective partners.
UPA § 38(1).
54. HILLMAN, supra note 21, § 5.3.3.3, at 5:12 (citing Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray,
562 N.E.2d 435, 440, 442-443 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Levy v. Nassau Queens Med. Group,
476 N.Y.S.2d 613, 614 (App. Div. 1984); Gill v. Mallory, 80 N.Y.S.2d 155, 157-58 (App.
Div. 1948)); id. § 5.3.3., at S-5:2 (citing Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597 (Tex.
App. 1995, writ granted) ("'Bad faith' in this context means only that partners cannot expel
another partner for self-gain.")); see GEORGE H. CAIN, LAW PARTNERSHIP: ITS RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 161-66 (1996). Cain refers to the classic cases of Holman v. Coie and
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walader the question of whether a less-than-unanimous amendment mecha-
nism can be used to insert and then exercise an expulsion clause did not
arise, because the management committee simply elected to proceed with
the expulsion without the benefit of any expulsion provision in the partner-
ship agreement. Thus, Judge Cook's musings on amendment are not
essential to the ruling.
As to the finding that Cadwalader breached its fiduciary duty to
Beasley, Judge Cook's analysis raises questions, although the result is de-
fensible. The fundamental question is whether the partnership can - in the
absence of an agreement ex ante to allow such behavior.- target some
partners for ouster.' At one point, Judge Cook appears to believe that it
is inappropriate per se for a partnership to so differentiate between partners:
As Justice Cardozo observed in Meinhard .... "For each the venture
had its phases of fair weather and foul. The two were in it jointly, for
better or worse." When the partnership encounters foul weather, the
partners must either all stay the course or all abandon it.'
Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray. Cain's conclusion does not raise the good faith question: "The
lessons of Holman and Lawlis are that a partnership, with a properly drawn partnership
agreement, can expel a partner without notice, without cause, and without providing any
reason." CAIN, supra, at 166. But one of the cases cited by Cain indicates that a predatory
purpose will violate the good faith obligation owed the expelled partner. Holman v. Cole, 522
P.2d 515, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). The Washington appellate court stated:
Plaintiffs' claims do not relate to the business aspects or property rights of this part-
nership. There is no evidence the purpose of the severance was to gain any business
or property advantage to the remaining partners. Consequently, in that context,
there has been no showing of breach of the duty of good faith toward plaintiffs.
Id. The Indiana Court of Appeals in Lawlis is not as clear. It first distinguishes a partner
from an at-will employee and notes the statutory good faith requirement and then addresses the
question of a predatory expulsion: "[I1f the power to involuntarily expel partners granted by
a partnership agreement is exercised in bad faith or for a 'predatory purpose,' . . . the
partnership agreement is violated, giving rise to an action for damages the affected partner has
suffered as a result of his expulsion." Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 440
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990). But later in the opinion, the court very narrowly draws the require-
ments:
Where the remaining partners in a firm deem it necessary to expel a partner under
a no cause expulsion clause in a partnership agreement freely negotiated and entered
into, the expelling partners act in "good faith" regardless of ntivation if that act
does not cause a wrongful withholding of money or property legally due the expelled
partner at the time he is expelled.
Id. at 442-43 (emphasis added).
55. This assumes that a specific and clear enough agreement could be drafted to allow
such behavior without a violation of the partners' fiduciary obligations of loyalty and good
faith.
56. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL
499
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But Judge Cook also stated that there was a way for the Cadwalader part-
ners to eject the targeted partners without violating either the partnership
agreement or the firm's fiduciary duty:
There was a way for CW&T to address the problem of profitability
and the presence of too many unproductive partners.... That was to
present the problem to the partnership with a proposed amendment to the
partnership agreement providing for the expulsion of partners. This could
have been done pursuant to paragraph "0" of the partnership agreement. I
But doesn't amending the partnership agreement and expelling the non-
productive partners violate Judge Cook's "all stay the course or all abandon
it" rule? There is an absolutist strain of partnership law that would force
the partners to either all sink or all swim. Chief Justice Cardozo did, after
all, put it that Meinhard and Salmon "were in it.jointly, for better or for
worse.""8 Under such a rule, for the Cadwalader partners to amend the
partnership agreement to include an expulsion mechanism and then expel
the targeted partners would be clearly inappropriate. Indeed, under such
an absolutist approach it would arguably be inappropriate for the partners
to use a pre-existing partnership agreement provision to expel the targeted
partners. Under such an approach, Judge Cook would be wrong to suggest
that the partners could have amended and expelled.
There is a second analysis, however, under which Judge Cook's pro-
nouncements are not inconsistent and his judgment is defensible. The key
is our conception of the partnership relation. The underlying principle of
438777, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996) (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548
(N.Y. 1928)). The "all abandon it" option does not mean that the law firm has to completely
break up, leaving no brick standing on another. It simply means that the partnership has to
be dissolved and wound up in the sense of a fair bulk sale of assets to the partners who wish
to continue. Examples of this type of dissolution abound, albeit with the dissolving party
typically being the exiting partner. See Sharon Walsh, Fight over Compensation Leads to a
Legal Breakup, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1996, at Cl. In the case of the Washington D.C. firm
of Nussbaum & Wald, Michael Nussbaum, the "founding partner and major rainmaker ...
announced he was dissolving the firm." Id. At issue was Nussbaum's compensation:
"Nussbaum . . . believed he was entitled to 36 percent of the net profits" under an oral
agreement he claimed had been in effect "for some time." Id. The other five equity partners
believed Nussbaum was worth his pro rata one-sixth share, there being no oral or written
agreement on the division of net profits. Id. "'I'm sure they think I'm greedy and I think
they're greedy,' Nussbaum said. . . 'I thought my contribution as a rainmaker and a worker
was worth more.'" Id. In a nice twist, the Post reported that name partners Michael
Nussbaum and Robert Wald first met when Nussbaum represented Wald in the breakup of
Wald's former firm. Id.
57. Cadwalader, 1996 WL 438777, at *6.
58. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.).
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fiduciary-based partnership law seems clear: by joining the partnership,
each partner agrees to advance the collective interest and not the short term
individual interest of the partner.5 9 This is not an abjuration of self-interest:
Far from it. Individuals elect to join a partnership because they calculate
that they will maximize their individual long-term interest through the
collective enterprise, compared with alternative investments of capital and
labor. This view of the partnership relation is clearly in accord with
the traditional commentators' and case law,6' and it is supported by some
thoughtful contemporary analyses.62
Under the nonabsolutist analysis, the partners need not all either stay
the course or abandon the venture, but the decision as to whether some
partners are to be thrown overboard must be based on the best interests of
the collective, not the best interests of individual partners who have the
power to effectuate the expulsions.
Admittedly, it can be a fine distinction, and perhaps an illusory one
when the group of nontargeted partners is coextensive with the group of
partners maldng the decision to expel the targeted partners.' This analysis
59. Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partner-
ship Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523, 527 (1993).
60. Id. at 527 n.14; see JOHN COLLYER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PARTNERSHIP § 189, at 185 (4th Am. ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1853) ("The good faith of the
partners is mutually pledged to each other, that the business shall be conducted ... for their
mutual advantage... ."); EUGENE A. GILMORE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS,
INCLUDING LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 375 (1911) ("As the partnership relation is one of mutual
confidence and trust, every member is obligated in all partnership affairs to consider the
mutual welfare of all the partners, rather than his own private benefit."); NATHANIEL
LINDLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP *305 (5th ed., Callaghan & Co. 1888)
("Good faith requires that a partner shall not obtain a private advantage at the expense of the
firm. He is bound in all transactions affecting the partnership to do his best for the common
body. .. ").
61. Vestal, supra note 59, at 527 n.14; see Clement v. Clement, 260 A.2d 728, 729 (Pa.
1970) ("One should not have to deal with his partner as though he were the opposite party in
an arms-length transaction. One should be allowed to trust his partner, to expect that he is
pursuing a common goal and not working at cross-purposes.").
62. Claire M. Dickerson, Is it Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts: Fiduciary
Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 111, 118 (1993) ("[A]
partner is required to subordinate his or her separate self-interest, but is not required to elim-
inate or deny the existence of a conflict."). I also find helpful, "if somewhat wide of the
mark," Professor Larry Mitchell's analysis of the fiduciary duties of participants in closely
held corporations. Vestal, supra note 59, at 528 n. 15 (discussing Mitchell, supra note 47, at
1676).
63. Such was not the case in Cadwalader. To the extent the full partnership approved
(or did not reject) the management committee actions, the step was not taken until six weeks
after the management committee voted to expel the partners, including Beasley. Beasley v.
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is certainly more complicated than the absolutist prohibition. How does a
judge, faced with the type of situation Judge Cook faced in Cadwalader,
decide whether the partners who made the decision to expel another partner
were motivated by the collective interest or their own, individual interests?
One approach would be to shift the burden of proof, so that the partnership
would have to prove that the challenged action advanced a legitimate
business purpose of the collective." Upon the partnership making the
threshold proof, the burden would switch to the plaintiff-partner to prove
that the partnership had other options which could have advanced the
identified collective interest with less harm to the plaintiff.'
Other approaches are available. 61 One could avoid the motivation
issue and instead focus on the procedural regularity of the transac-
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL 438777, at *2-*3 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996) (noting that management committee vote to close the Florida office
occurred in August 29, 1994; the sixty-seven to twelve partner nonrejection of management
committee proposal occurred in mid-October).
That the size of the firm can be a factor in assessing good faith is confirmed in Bohatch,
in which the expelled partner's claimed predatory purpose was rejected as a matter of law by
the court:
Bohatch ... argues that she was expelled so that the other partners could
acquire her partnership interest. Bohatch's partnership share was so small, how-
ever, that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the partners' expulsion
of Bohatch was motivated by their desire to acquire her partnership share.
Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597, 604 (Tex. App. 1995, writ granted).
64. This would adopt an approach taken in the close corporation setting. See Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). Under Wilkes, if
minority shareholders of a closely held corporation allege "a breach of the strict good faith
duty owed them by the majority .... [i]t must be asked whether the controlling group can
demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action." Id. The Wilkes approach represents
a substantial retreat from pure fiduciary analysis. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 1699-1714.
This analysis parallels that suggested to evaluate the obligations owed to preferred share-
holders. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock (And Wy We Should
Care About It), 51 Bus. LAW. 443, 475-76 (1996).
65. Under Wilkes, once the majority demonstrates a legitimate business purpose for its
action, the burden shifts to the minority to demonstrate an alternative method of achieving the
same result with less harm to the minority. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. The Wilkes court
stated: "When an asserted business purpose... is advanced by the majority ... we think it
is open to minority stockholders to demonstrate that the same legitimate objective could have
been achieved through an alternative course of action less harmful to the minority's interest."
Id. In his treatise, Professor Hillman suggests that "the availability of less drastic alterna-
tives" to expulsion may be relevant to the good faith inquiry, although he acknowledges there
is "little authority in case law" for such a measurement. HILLMAN, supra note 21,
§§ 5.3.3.3.-.4., at 5:11-5:12.
66. Professor Mitchell's discussion is instructive on this point. Lawrence E. Mitchell,
The Naked Emperor: A Corporate Lawyer Looks at RUPA's Fiduciary Provisions, 54 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 465, 472-76 (1997).
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tion,67 or if procedural fairness could not be demonstrated, one could focus
on the substantive fairness of the transaction.'
The record in Cadwalader appears to be so gross that it would not
matter which approach was taken. The management committee's actions
would clearly be inappropriate under the absolutist analysis.
Under the nonabsolutist analysis, using the first, burden-shifting and
balancing approach, there are some indications that the controlling partners
in Cadwalader could have made at least the threshold showing required. 9
Even co-chair John Fritts, in his unhelpful deposition statement, comes
close to making the collective-interest argument: "Unless we didn't get
Cadwalader's profitability to where it was with our competitors' firms, my
great fear was that people were going to leave and that we would then not
be able to sustain ourselves. '70 That statement certainly could be translated
as a concern for the collective interest, not merely a naked attempt to expel
partners for the direct benefit of certain other partners. But even if the
management committee could recharacterize its motives, it is not at all clear
that Beasley, who the court found to be "both an extraordinary rainmaker
and a skilled litigator," 7' couldn't have made a showing of a less injurious
way of maintaining firm profitability.
As to the procedural and substantive fairness tests, the record is not
helpful to the management committee. Judge Cook's findings in Cadwal-
ader, which stress the lack of full disclosure and the self-interestedness of
the decisionmakers, would seem to preclude a finding in favor of the
67. This is the fair dealing test discussed in the corporation context by Professor
Mitchell. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DuKE L.J. 425,
452-54 (1993). Mitchell stated: "Fair dealing focuses on the process by which these terms
are reached and is satisfied by proof that the negotiations surrounding the transaction
were structured to replicate those that would take place between unrelated parties." Id. at 445-
46.
68. This is the fair price test discussed in the corporation context by Professor Mitchell.
Mitchell, supra note 67, at 445, 446-52. Mitchell stated: "Fair price is concerned with the
substantive terms of the transaction and is satisfied by proof that the financial aspects of the
transaction fall within a range that would be acceptable to unrelated parties." Id. at 445
(authorities omitted).
69. Firm profitability, as measured by the per share value, had declined in both 1993
and 1994. Cadwalader, 1996 WL 438777, at *1. The Palm Beach office operated at a loss
in 1993. Id. The other senior partner in the Palm Beach office had "personality flaws" that
made him "extraordinarily disruptive, exhibiting unpredictable temper tantrums." Id. And
the Palm Beach office, although not Beasley, was involved in a sexual harassment complaint.
Id.
70. Id. at *7 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at *1.
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management committee under a procedural fairness test.' The award of
$1,987,502 in compensatory damages,'73 taken together with the reports of
the firm's initial offer to the targeted partners, would seem to preclude a
finding in favor of the management committee under a substantive fairness
test.74
In the end, the procedural irregularity and substantive inadequacy
justify Judge Cook's decision and the award of punitive damages. A good
faith attempt to treat a soon-to-be expelled partner fairly is simply inconsis-
tent with the environment portrayed by Judge Cook, an environment in
which a cabal of self-proclaimed "Good Guys,"'75 with the threat of mass
resignations, sends the management committee into a series of clandestine
meetings in which the cabal blackmails the management committee to use
confidential firm information to generate hit lists of partners to be elimi-
nated, and where the insiders disregard competent legal advice on their
powers, make bad faith offers to the target partners, and conspire to disad-
vantage some partners to benefit the others. In the face of such behavior,
Judge Cook's response is appropriate, and the failure of the management
committee to anticipate the reaction is astounding'76 and perhaps civilly
actionable on the part of the other partners not expelled.'
72. Id. at *6 (characterizing management committee action as "a clandestine plan to
wrongfully expel some partners for the financial gain of other partners").
73. Id. at *8.
74. Id. at *6 (characterizing management committee action as "a clandestine plan to
wrongfully expel some partners for the financial gain of other partners").
75. Ann Davis, Memos Expose "Project Rightsize" - Cadwalader Papers Are Unsealed
in Ex-Partner Suit, NAT'L L.J., May 20, 1996, at A6.
76. As to the use of clandestine pressure to expel a partner for personal and not collec-
tive reasons, the management committee at Cadwalader would have profited by reading an
example from 1853, quoted in Professor Hillman's essential text:
[I]t was not fair nor right - it was clandestine.., on the part of Mr. Vaughan,
to secure the ear . . . of those parties having the controlling power . . . to get
them... to sign this [expulsion] document, without the slightest communication
to Mr. Blisset .... If Cave, Daniel, and Vaughan were equally of one mind
[favoring the expulsion]... that would be sufficient; but, that Mr. Vaughan, who
alone wished to get rid of Mr. Blisset - no other person having the slightest
desire to do so - should not by these threats procure the concurrence of these two
partners, and so effect that object.
HILLmAN, supra note 21, § 5.3.1., at 5:4-5:5 (citing Blisset v. Daniel, 10 Hare 493, 530-31
(1853)).
77. It is possible the actions of the management committee would support a claim by the
remaining partners for breach of the fiduciary duty of care. The record does not indicate
whether the Cadwalader partnership agreement attempts to insulate the management commit-
tee from liability for violations of the duty of care, but typically partners have a good faith
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The controlling partners in Cadwalader sought to deprive James Beas-
ley of two things to which he was entitled. The first was a fair price for
the partnership interest expropriated. The second was the right to partici-
pate in the dissolution and winding up of the partnership. For if there was
no expulsion right, then the only avenue open to the insurgents and their
management committee allies was to dissolve the partnership.78 They had
the power to take this step.79 But once the step was taken, the partnership
duty of care:
Under a good faith standard of care, a partner is not liable to the partnership or
his or her co-partners for acts which are not fraudulent or wanton and which are
undertaken in good faith .... Partners have been held liable for mismanagement
when they were grossly negligent or acted in reckless disregard for the affairs of
the partnership.
J. WILLIAM CALLISON, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNER-
SHIPS § 12.02, at 12-6 (1995).
In Beasley, Judge Cook found that the management committee's actions were not taken in
good faith, Cadwalader, 1996 WL 438777, at *3-*4; that the actions constituted "a gross
breach of fiduciary duty," id. at *7; and that the "facts establish at least conduct which was
so reckless as to amount to a conscious disregard for the rights of Beasley and the other ex-
pelled partners." Id. With a very large sum potentially at issue - in excess of $3,500,000
in damages and costs, plus the costs of appeals, plus any recovery in the pending New York
litigation (as to which Judge Cook's findings may have issue preclusive effect if the New York
plaintiff can meet the full faith and credit and fairness hurdles and if New York recognizes
offensive issue preclusion) - one can imagine partners who were not members of the insurgent
group or the management committee at the time of Project Rightsize exploring the possibility
of a breach of care claim against the management committee.
78. HILLMAN, supra note 21, § 5.3.2., at 5:6-5:7. Hillman states:
An expulsion by act of partners requires a preexisting agreement specifically
authorizing the removal of partners. Absent such an agreement, an expulsion may
not be accomplished without the unanimous consent of the partners; such consent
would effectively be given for amending the partnership agreement to allow
expulsions, a circumstance unlikely to occur since the target of the expulsion
action would need to approve the amendment. The "firing" of a partner unsup-
ported by an underlying expulsion agreement is not an expulsion but is a dissolu-
tion by express will of the partner's initiating the "removal" of one of their
colleagues.
Id. (authorities omitted). Professor Hillman does indicate that a partner may also be removed,
absent an expulsion provision in the partnership agreement, by judicial decree. Id. § 5.2, at
5:2-5:3.
79. See Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 42-43 (Cal. 1961). If the firm was an at-will
partnership, any partner could dissolve the partnership without violation of the partnership
agreement. UPA § 31(1)(b). If the firm was a partnership for a specific term, any partner
could dissolve the partnership, although the dissolving partner would be in violation of the
partnership agreement. UPA § 31(2). This would prevent the wrongfully dissolving partner
from participating in the winding up, UPA § 37, and would open that partner to a claim for
damages. UPA § 38(2)(a)ll.
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would have to be wound up,' and James Beasley would have the right to
participate in the winding up process.81 He would have the ability to force
a sale of the partnership assets, the application of the sale proceeds to
partnership liabilities, and the cash distribution of any surplus to the part-
ners.' This would include the right to receive information' and the right
to petition for judicial supervision in the appropriate case.' By seeking to
expel Beasley, the insurgents attempted unfairly to deprive him of this very
substantial leverage.'
The cabal and the managing partners in Cadwalader apparently pro-
ceeded from the belief that the relations of partners are entirely economic;
they assumed away the historical fiduciary obligations of partners. Judge
Cook's findings of bad faith and his awards of significant compensatory and
punitive damages are the direct results of those flawed assumptions.
III. Cadwalader Under RUPA: The Uncertain Results of Reform
How would Cadwalader be decided under the RUPA? It is a measure
of our failure in this reform that the answer is not clear.
80. UPA § 30.
81. UPA § 37 ("Unless otherwise agreed the partners who have not wrongfully
dissolved the partnership . . .[have] the right to wind up the partnership affairs .... ");
HILLMAN, supra note 21, § 5.3.2., at 5:6-5:7 ("The distinction [between a partner properly
expelled and one forced out through dissolution] is of some importance because a partner
terminated but not expelled has the power to demand a liquidation and winding up.").
82. UPA § 38(1) ("When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contravention of
the partnership agreement, each partner,... unless otherwise agreed, may have the part-
nership property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash
the net amount owing to the respective partners.").
83. Smith v. Brown & Jones, 633 N.Y.S.2d 436, 442 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (finding
obligation to disclose financial information to targeted but unexpelled, departing partner).
84. UPA § 37. It should be noted that, unlike the right to participate in the winding
up, the right to petition for a judicial winding up cannot be waived. Compare UPA § 37
(first cl.) ("Unless otherwise agreed the partners who have not wrongfully dissolved the
partnership... [have] the right to wind up the partnership affairs ... "), with UPA § 37
(second cl.) ("[Provided, however, that any partner . . . upon cause shown, may obtain
winding up by the court.").
85. In contrast, an expulsion properly done would have limited Beasley to a cash-out
remedy. UPA § 38(1) ("But if dissolution is caused by expulsion of a partner, bona fide
under the partnership agreement and if the expelled partner is discharged from all partner-
ship liabilities, either by payment or agreement under section 36(2), he shall receive in cash
only the net amount due him from the partnership.").
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Under RUPA, as under the UPA, a partnership agreement may contain
a provision for the expulsion of a partner." The Cadwalader partnership
agreement contained no such provision. But unlike the UPA, RUPA
contains a detailed statutory mechanism for the involuntary separation of a
partner from the partnership, after a judicial determination of cause.' Once
a partner is dissociated under this provision, the remaining partners can
proceed to a purchase of the dissociated partner's interest in lieu of a
dissolution and winding up.8 The problem with this approach is that the
86. REVISED UNIF. PARTNERsIp ACT (1994) (RUPA) § 601(3), 6 U.L.A. § 601(3)
(1995) ("A partner is dissociated from a partnership upon ... the partner's expulsion
pursuant to the partnership agreement."); UPA § 31(d).
87. RUPA § 601(5). Section 601(5) states:
A partner is dissociated from a partnership upon the occurrence of any of the
following events:
(5) on application by the partnership or another partner, the partner's expulsion
by judicial determination because:
(i) the partner engaged in wrongful conduct that adversely and materially affected
the partnership business;
(ii) the partner willfully or persistently committed a material breach of the
partnership agreement or of a duty owed to the partnership or the other partners
under Section 404; or
(iii) the partner engaged in conduct relating to the partnership business which
makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with
the partner.
Id. The UPA provides for judicial dissolution in the parallel cases. UPA § 32; see ROBERT
W. HILLMAN, ALLAN W. VESTAL & DONALD J. WEIDNER, GENERAL AND LIMITED LIABIL-
ITY PARTNERSIPS UNDER THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 201-04 (1996).
RUPA also provides for a partner's expulsion on the unanimous vote of the other part-
ners. RUPA § 601(4). Given the insurgents' designs on multiple partners in their purge,
this course of action was not available to them. Additionally, such a vote requires that one
of four factual predicates be present: illegality, a transfer of all or substantially all of the
targeted partner's transferable interest, if the partner is a corporation and it has lost its
charter, and if the partner is a dissolved partnership. None of the factual predicates was
available in the Cadwalader situation. This is not surprising, because the grounds 'are
narrow and have little relevance to the law firm setting." HILLMAN, supra note 21, § 5.2,
at 5:3.
88. The process is somewhat complicated. In this case the partnership would apply
for a judicial determination of cause. RUPA § 601(5). Under the applicable switching
provision, if the dissociation results in a dissolution and winding up, then the parties proceed
under Article 8; if it does not, then Article 7 applies. RUPA § 603(a). But RUPA requires
a dissolution and winding up only upon "notice from a partner, other than a partner who is
dissociated under Section 601(2) through (10), of that partner's express will to withdraw as
a partner." RUPA § 801(1). This reflects a desire on the part of the RUPA drafters to
restrict the situations in which the departure of a partner would require a winding up of the
partnership business. RUPA § 801 cmts. 1-5. Because in this case the dissociation of the
507
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record is absolutely devoid of any indication that, as to James Beasley, the
partnership could have made the showing of cause required.8 9 If the firm
could not make the factual showing necessary for a judicial determination
leading to Beasley's involuntary dissociation, then only two avenues re-
mained: a collusive dissolution and winding up or amendment of the part-
nership agreement to permit the expulsion of Beasley.
In the collusive dissolution and winding up, a partner other than
Beasley would give notice of intent to dissociate.' That would trigger a
dissolution and winding up,9 in which the controlling partners would cause
the partnership assets to be the subject of a bulk sale to a newly formed
partnership comprised of all the predissolution partners (including the
partner whose dissociation triggered the dissolution and winding up) except
for Beasley and the other targets.'
There are two fundamental problems with the collusive dissolution and
winding up option. The first is that Beasley could participate in the wind-
ing up and could request judicial supervision of the process.' The second
is that Beasley would remain a partner during the winding up. Because of
Beasley's continued status as a partner, two key nonfiduciary disclosure
obligations,' two of the partners' and the partnership's fiduciary duties of
partner would be pursuant to RUPA Section 601(5), it would not require a dissolution and
winding up under RUPA Section 801, and thus would be handled under Article 7. Article
7 provides for a negotiated settlement and, if the negotiations are not productive, for a
judicial determination of a buyout price. RUPA § 701.
89. RUPA § 601(5). Judge Cook characterized James Beasley as "both an extraordi-
nary rainmaker and a skilled litigator." Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No.
CL-94-8646 "Al," 1996 WL 438777, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996). He further opined
that Beasley's plan and preparations to depart the firm were not a breach of Beasley's
fiduciary duties toward the firm. Id. at *6.
90. RUPA § 601(1).
91. RUPA § 801(1).
92. White & Case is a classic collusive dissolution, in which the firm simply dissolved
and reformed without one twenty-year partner. Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589,
591 (N.Y. 1996).
93. Assuming Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft is a partnership at will, any partner
could dissociate at will. RUPA § 601(1). The cabal member giving notice of dissolution
could force a collusive dissolution and winding up. RUPA §§ 801(1), 801 cmt. 3. Unfortu-
nately for the cabal, any "partner who has not wrongfully dissociated may participate in
winding up the partnership's business." RUPA § 803(a). Worse, "on application of any
partner ... [a court], for good cause shown, may order judicial supervision of the winding
up." Id.
94. The nonfiduciary information access and disclosure provisions are not temporally
limited as to partners. RUPA § 403(b), (c). In this case, the obligation to disclose "without
demand, any information concerning the partnership's business and affairs reasonably
THE MESS WE HAVE MADE OF PARTNERSHIP LAW
loyalty,' the fiduciary duty of care," and the nonfiduciary obligation of
good faith and fair dealing' apply during the "winding up" period. This
would be potentially quite awkward for the other partners, because during
required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the partnership
agreement or this [Act]" is implicated when the partnership is considering selling all or
substantially all of its assets to a partnership formed by all but one of the original partner-
ship's partners. RUPA § 403(c)(1). In the case of a collusive dissolution and winding up,
such relevant information would presumably include the plans to exclude the targeted
partners and any information bearing on the adequacy of consideration. Also implicated is
the obligation to disclose, "on demand, any other information concerning the partnership's
business and affairs, except to the extent the demand or the information demanded is
unreasonable or otherwise improper under the circumstances." RUPA § 403(c)(2). In the
case of a collusive dissolution and winding up, one could expect a substantial number of
demands for information to be made.
95. The duty of loyalty obligation to account would be implicated if the "new"
partnership bought the assets from the "old" partnership for inadequate consideration. The
duty to account applies "in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business." RUPA
§ 404(b)(1). The duty of loyalty obligation "to refrain from dealing with the
partnership ... as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership"
would be implicated if the "new" partnership bought the assets from the "old" partnership,
whether for adequate or inadequate consideration. RUPA § 404(b)(2). But see RUPA
§ 404(f) ("A partner may . . . transact . . . business with the partnership, and as to
each . . . transaction the rights and obligations of the partner are the same as those of a
person who is not a partner, subject to other applicable law."); HILLMAN ET AL., supra note
87, at 152-54. The duty to refrain from adversarial dealings with the partnership applies
"in the conduct or winding up of the partnership business." RUPA § 404(b)(2).
96. The duty of care runs to both the partnership and the other partners, and requires
a partner to "[refrain] from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, inten-
tional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law." RUPA § 404(c) ("A partner's duty
of care to the partnership and the other partners in the conduct and winding up of the part-
nership business is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless
conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law."). It should be noted that
Judge Cook found that the management committee's conduct constituted "a gross breach
of fiduciary duty," and the conduct "was so reckless as to amount to a conscious disregard
for the rights of Beasley and the other expelled partners." Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wick-
ersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL 438777, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23,
1996).
97. RUPA § 404(d) ("A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the
other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement and exercise any rights
consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing."). Although itself not
formally temporally limited, the iionfidticiary obligation of good faith and fair dealing
depends for its application on the existence of a statutory or contractual obligation, extend-
ing it in this case into the winding up period by virtue of the two applicable disclosure
obligations and the two applicable fiduciary duties. HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 155.
Professor Mitchell has helped contrast fiduciary obligation and contractual good faith.
Mitchell, supra note 64, at 457-60. It should be noted that he deals with good faith, not the
RUPA standard of "good faith and fair dealing." RUPA § 404(d).
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the winding up period they would want to accomplish a set-up bulk pur-
chase of the partnership assets by the new partnership.
The problem with amendment of the partnership agreement to permit
the expulsion of Beasley is that the amendment process is subject to some
of the same information, fiduciary, and good faith duties as apply in the
context of the collusive dissolution and winding up. Both the obligation
to disclose without a predicate demand98 and the obligation to further
disclose on demand' are effective in this scenario as well."°  Does the duty
of loyalty come into play? The duty runs to both the partnership and the
individual partners, including the partners on the hit list. 1 ' But to find a
violation of the duty of loyalty, one must identify a violation of one of the
three exclusive subparts of the duty of loyalty: the duty to account, the duty
to refrain from adversarial conduct, and the duty to refrain from competi-
tion."° Like the collusive dissolution and sale option, the amendment and
expulsion option presents a plausible claim for a duty of loyalty violation,
through a violation of the duty to account, if the compensation offered the
expelled partner is inadequate. This permits a finding that the expelling
partners are using the expulsion to divert partnership assets for their per-
sonal use through the mechanism of the replacement partnership. 3
98. RUPA § 403(c)(1); HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 136-38.
99. RUPA § 403(c)(2); HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 138.
100. The RUPA disclosure obligations are rather broad. Allan W. Vestal, The Disclo-
sure Obligations of Partners Inter Se Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994:
Is the Contractarian Revolution Failing?, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1559, 1577-82 (1995).
Under the "any information concerning the partnership's business and affairs reasonably
required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties" standard, RUPA
§ 403(c)(1), one can imagine the management committee being forced to divulge all manner
of information on partner compensation, partner productivity, partnership expenses, and
management committee plans and projections previously held as confidential by the manage-
ment committee.
101. RUPA § 404(b).
102. RUPA § 404(b).
103. It should also be noted that any act in the amendment-expulsion scenario that did
violate the fiduciary duty of loyalty could be authorized by "all of the partners or a number
or percentage specified in the partnership agreement." RUPA § 103(b)(3)(ii). This raises
the interesting possibility that the cabal and their management committee followers could
assemble enough votes to violate the duty of loyalty owed the targeted partners and simulta-
neously approve their violation. Of course, such an action would require full disclosure -
presumably not a problem - and would require the inclusion of a provision allowing such
ratification in the Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft partnership agreement - potentially a
problem if the absence of an expulsion provision is any indication.
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Potentially the greatest barrier to the amendment-expulsion option is
the nonfiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing." It is not yet
clear what meaning the courts will attach to the phrase; it is not defined in
RUPA1II or the commentary."°6 The drafters "decided to leave the terms
undefined in the Act and allow the courts to develop their meaning based
on the experience of real cases."'107
The RUPA approval of self-interest also comes into play, again with
unclear results: "A partner does not violate a duty or obligation under this
[Act] or under the partnership agreement merely because the partner's
conduct furthers the partner's own interest. ,,10 There are two very differ-
ent interpretations of the approval of self-interest; the language can be seen
as either meaning nothing or meaning everything."0 Under the narrow
interpretation, the language is merely an evidentiary rule that says very
little."' Under the broader interpretation, the cited language is a broad-
form insulation from liability based on the good faith and fair dealing
standard."' The commentary and history from the section offer support to
both interpretations, with perhaps a slight edge to the broader reading."'
In his Symposium contribution, Professor Larry Mitchell suggests yet a
104. RUPA § 404(d) ("A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the
other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement and exercise any rights
consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.").
105. Neither the definitions section of the Act, RUPA § 101, nor the fiduciary duty
section, RUPA § 404(d), defines the term "good faith and fair dealing."
106. RUPA § 404 cmt. 4; see HILLMANETAL., supra note 87, at 149-51.
107. RUPA § 404 cmt. 4.
108. RUPA § 404(e).
109. See HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 151-52.
110. Under this interpretation, the language could be paraphrased as: "mhe fact that
a partner directly personally benefits from the partner's conduct in the partnership context
does not, without more, establish a violation of the partner's duties or obligations under
RUPA or the partnership agreement." Id. at 151 (emphasis omitted).
111. I have suggested that:
Under the broad interpretation, § 404(e) means that partners are free to pursue
their short-term, individual self-interest without notice to or the consent of the
partnership, subject only to the specific restrictions contained in the § 404(b) duty
of loyalty - in effect that the pursuit of self-interest cannot be a violation of the
non-fiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
Id.
112. See id. at 151-52. The approval of self-interest language appears to have been an
attempt to implement Professor Hillman's "rebargaining" analysis. Robert W. Hillman,
Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 425, 442-46 (1987).
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third reading of the self-interest language: that it establishes a benefit-detri-
ment test for partners' self-interested transactions."'
If the goal of RUPA was to provide predictability to the application of
partnership law to real cases, Cadwalader is yet another indication that
RUPA falls short of the mark." 4 If the goal of RUPA was to provide a
subjectively fair outcome, to the extent Cadwalader would be decided
differently under RUPA than it was at the trial level under the UPA, the
reform is suspect.
There is a case to be made for the proposition that RUPA is the third-
best possible outcome of the partnership law reform process. The best
outcome was to retain a traditional fiduciary orientation for the default non-
economic rights and obligations of partners. The second-best outcome was
to adopt comprehensively a contractarian orientation for the default non-
economic rights and obligations of partners." 5 The third-best, and worst
possible, outcome was to compromise and adopt portions of each position,
producing an internally contradictory and unworkable combination of
provisions. Commentators from both the left" 6 and the right"7 have criti-
cized RUPA as consistent with the third-best, worst possible outcome. 118
The drafters of RUPA proceeded from the belief that the relations of
partners can best be characterized as matters of contract, not status; they
assumed away the historical fiduciary obligations of partners. Then they
trimmed and assumed that a coherent partnership statute could be fashioned
113. Mitchell, supra note 66, at 473-76.
114. It is not, of course, the only such indication. See Alexander v. Sims, 249 S.W.2d
832, 835-37 (Ark. 1952); Allan W. Vestal, Should the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of
1994 Really Be Retroactive?, 50 Bus. LAW. 267, 267-68 n.3 (1994).
115. This is not, of course, to say that the second-best option is workable. Professor
Mitchell argues persuasively in the corporate context that the complexity and indeterminacy
of firm life makes it impossible to substitute contractual provisions for trust. Mitchell,
supra note 67, at 477-80. There is no reason to think that his observations are any less
forceful when applied to the unincorporated firm.
116. Vestal, supra note 100, at 1627-3 1.
117. J. Dennis Hynes, Fiduciary Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry into Freedom of
Contract, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 54 (Spring 1995); Larry E. Ribstein, The
Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus. LAW. 45, 77-78
(1993).
118. I hasten to note for the record my sincere belief that RUPA embodies some
significant advances in partnership law over the UPA, provisions unrelated to the fiduciary
or contractarian orientation of the draft. The profession owes a debt of gratitude to the
Reporter, the members of the drafting committee, and the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) for their time and efforts on the partnership act
revision process.
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without an internally consistent view of the nature of partners' obligations
inter se. The inability of RUPA to deal with Cadwalader is the direct
result of those flawed assumptions.
IV. Future Cadwaladers: The Atomization of Partnership Law
Having the benefit of the Cadwalader decision, how would one advise
a law firm, or any firm, to structure its affairs in advance to be able to
expel a participant absent cause, without opening itself up to claims such
as those of James Beasley?
The appropriate response divides into three parts: the firm members
need to select a business form, they need to select a jurisdiction, and they
need to negotiate the terms of their agreement. These are not sequential
steps; the firm members need to do all three simultaneously. Additionally,
they are not inconsequential steps; each can differentially advantage or
disadvantage individual partners within the partnership, thus requiring their
individual attention and participation.
Only ten years ago the world was not so complicated. However, over
the last decade we have atomized the law of the unincorporated firm in
three ways: we have introduced new forms, we have broken down statutory
uniformity among the states as to each form, and we have permitted
broader contractual modification of noneconomic statutory provisions.
A. The Multiplication of Forms: The Rise of LLPs and LLCs
A decade ago, there were two forms available for the unincorporated,
multiperson firm: the general partnership and the limited partnership." 9
Such is not the case today.' In virtually every jurisdiction there are now
four forms: general partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability
partnerships (LLPs),'2 ' and limited liability companies (LLCs).11
119. A handful of states also had limited partnership associations. See MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 449.371-.373 (West 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:3-1 to -29 (West 1993);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1783.01-.12 (Banks-Baldwin 1994). Colorado has recently
adopted a limited partnership association act. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 7-63-101 to -117 (Supp.
1996).
120. Allan W. Vestal, New and Revised American Laws for Unincorporated Firms
Create Signfcant Traps for the Unwary, in 2 PERSPECTVES ON COMPANY LAW (Fiona
Macmillan Patfield ed., forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 3, on file with author) (providing
general discussion of evolution of unincorporated business venture forms).
121. Vestal, supra note 120 (manuscript at 3-7). The early history of the LLP form is
interesting. See generally Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships:
Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1065 (1995). As of the fall of 1996,
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It might be argued that the multiplication of forms is a matter of
formality only, that the number of forms has not increased as a practical
LLP statutes had been adopted by at least forty jurisdictions. See Larry E. Ribstein,
Possible Futures for Unincorporated Firms, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 319, 320 n.4 (1996) (listing
forty jurisdictions with LLP statutes). As this is written, nine of the twelve jurisdictions
absent from Professor Ribstein's list have adopted LLP statutes, bringing the total number
to forty-nine. ALA. CODE §§ 10-8A-1001 to -1109 (Supp. 1996); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 32.05.405 - .760 (Michie 1996); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 425-151 to -180 (Michie,
WESTLAW through 1996 Reg. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 801-876 (West
Supp. 1996); Act of Apr. 12, 1996, 1996 Neb. Sess. Law Serv., L.B. 681 (WESTLAW
through 1996 Reg Sess.); Act of June 10, 1996, ch. 212, 1996 N.H. Adv. Leg. Serv., No.
2, at 260; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, §§ 401-417 (West Supp. 1997); 1996 R.I. Pub. Laws,
ch. 96-270; W. VA. CODE §§ 47B-10-1 to -5 (1996). The remaining states, Arkansas,
Vermont, and Wyoming, have not adopted LLP statutes.
Starting from RUPA, a working group under the auspices of the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) drafted a series of amendments to provide for limited liability partnerships. See
WORKING GROUP ON REGIsTERmD LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N
Bus. LAW SECTION, PROPOSED PROTOTYPE REGISTERED LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP
ACT - BASED ON UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (1994) (May 10, 1995 draft). In parallel
with the ABA working group, a NCCUSL drafting committee developed the RUPA-based
"Limited Liability Partnership Act: Amendment to Uniform Partnership Act (1994)." See
DRAFTING COMMITTEE ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP ACT, NCCUSL, LIMITED
LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP ACT: AMENDMENT TO UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (1994) (July
1996 draft). To avoid confusion with RUPA, I shall refer to the limited liability partnership
amendments as the Uniform Limited Liability Partnership Act Amendments (ULLPAA).
The ULLPAA was promulgated by NCCUSL at its July 1996 annual meeting. With the
promulgation of RUPA, and the work of the ABA and NCCUSL on RUPA-based limited
liability partnership statutes, the way is open for a second generation of RUPA-based limited
liability partnership statutes. As this is written, only three states have enacted such statutes.
ALA. CODE §§ 10-8A-1001 to -1109 (Supp. 1996); VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 50-73.79 to -73.149
(Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE §§ 47B-1-1 to -11-5 (1996).
122. Vestal, supra note 120 (manuscript at 7-8); see Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms
for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence from LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 369, 404-06
(1995) (hereinafter Ribstein, Theories). By the summer of 1996, LLC statutes have been
adopted in all of the states. By 1995, only Hawaii and Vermont had not adopted LLC
statutes. Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus.
LAw. 1, 1 (1995) (hereinafter Ribstein, Emergence). Both Hawaii and Vermont have now
adopted LLC statutes. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 428-101 to -1302 (Michie, WESTLAW
through 1996 Reg. Sess.); Act of May 22, 1996, H. 112, 1996 Vermont Laws P.A. 176
(WESTLAW through 1996 Reg. Sess.).
NCCUSL has approved for adoption by the states a Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act (ULLCA). UNiF. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT, 6A U.L.A. 425 (1995).
NCCUSL approved the ULLCA in 1994, and amended it as of January 1995. As of this
writing, the ULLCA has been adopted in four jurisdictions. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601
to -7651 (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156C, §§ 1-68 (West Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-43-101 to -1409 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 31B-1-101 to
-1306 (1996).
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matter because the new forms have rendered the traditional forms obsoles-
cent. Apart from statutory restrictions on some businesses being carried on
in the limited liability partnership form," quirky tax provisions," and out-
dated governmental regulations,"z it is difficult to conceive of a reason why
knowledgeable and well-represented participants would organize a firm as
a general partnership or a limited partnership. The significant points of dif-
ference between RUPA and the Uniform Limited Liability Partnership Act
Amendments (ULLPAA) relate to definitions, " choice of law,"V partner lia-
bilities," and those sections under which LLPs are established"z9 and main-
tained, 3 and those sections under which foreign LLPs are registered"' and
regulated.132 As the limited liability partnership and limited liability com-
pany forms have emerged, the traditional general partnership and limited
partnership should be going into eclipse. This is because the general and
limited partnership forms have no advantages over the limited liability
partnership and limited liability company forms - only disadvantages.
123. See N.Y. PARTNERsHIP LAW § 121-1500(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997) (restricting
LLP status to individuals and firms engaged in professional services). Professor Hamilton
indicates that the limitation to professional services is not as narrow as one might initially
imagine. Hamilton, supra note 121, at 1089 n.67 (definition includes such "professions"
as chiropractic, massage, midwives, acupuncture, and athletic trainers).
124. For example, franchise tax interpretations in some states evidently steer partici-
pants to limited partnership form in lieu of the limited liability partnership form.
125. Participation in some federal programs may cause ventures to be structured as
limited partnerships instead of limited liability partnerships.
126. ULLPAA § 101; HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 302-04.
127. The ULLPAA supersedes the chief executive office default choice of law rule with
respect to general partnerships, substituting for LLPs a place of filing rule that cannot be
modified. ULLPAA §§ 103(b)(9), 106(b); HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 304-07.
128. The ULLPAA speaks to the reduced liability of partners in LLPs and to the associ-
ated procedural changes with respect to partners in LLPs. ULLPAA § 306(c) (liability of
partners in LLPs); ULLPAA § 307(b), (d) (actions against LLP members individually);
HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 312-15. The ULLPAA addresses the liability of a part-
ner dissociated from an LLP. ULLPAA § 703(b) (dissociated partner liability conditioned
by Section 306); HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 326-28. The ULLPAA addresses the
postdissolution liability of a partner in an LLP. ULLPAA § 806(a) (liability to other part-
ners); ULLPAA § 807 (settlement of accounts and contributions); HILLMAN ET AL., supra
note 87, at 331-32. The ULLPAA addresses the postconversion and postmerger liability of
a partner in an LLP. ULLPAA § 903(e) (liability of limited partner who becomes general
partner following conversion); ULLPAA § 906(c) (liability of partner following merger).
129. ULLPAA § 1001 (discussing qualifications).
130. ULLPAA § 1003 (discussing annual reports).
131. ULLPAA § 1102.
132. ULLPAA §§ 1101-1105.
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Advising a firm seeking to avoid a Cadwalader-type situation, one
would presumably recommend either the LLP or LLC form.' For the
participants, it just makes sense to opt for limited liability if there is no
tradeoff. '3
There are concerns, however, both within the firm and for society.
Within the firm, the concerns arise because the shield from liability is not
absolute. Partners in LLPs and members in LLCs continue to have liability
for their own actions including various levels of liability for their actions
in supervising others.' 35 The allocation of such liability may change the
way in which participants organize their involvement, in ways that do not
work to the advantage of the firm. For example, when supervision brings
exposure to potential liability, partners may avoid supervising others, to the
overall detriment of the firm but to the benefit of the individual. 6 This is
not a problem in the world of theory - participants can always agree to
increase their exposure to liability to achieve an efficient result. One imag-
ines that it is more of a problem in the real world.
There is a second, social concern. By extending limited liability we
have reduced the assets available for third-party contract and tort claimants,
shifting some burdens of contract breaches and torts from those traditionally
responsible to either victims or society. And what have we gotten in
return? Nothing, apparently. 3 7 The fact that LLPs and LLCs are so popu-
133. This assumes no statutory restrictions on the ability to carry on a law practice in
the form selected.
134. It should be noted that case authority exists for treating the rights and obligations
of law firm participants as if they were partners even when the firm is organized as a
professional corporation, in effect ignoring the formal organization of the firm. See Fox v.
Abrams, 210 Cal. Rptr. 260, 263-66 (Ct. App. 1985); Boyd, Payne, Gates & Farthing, P.C.
v. Payne, Gates, Farthing & Radd, P.C., 422 S.E.2d 784, 784-88 (Va. 1992); HILLMAN,
supra note 21, at 6:3-6:6. The cases are not unanimous, however, and the better reasoned
analysis respects the form adopted. See Jones v. Teilborg, 727 P.2d 18, 25 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1986); In re Estate of Reichenbaum, 631 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179-81 (App. Div. 1995); HILL-
MAN, supra note 21, at 6:6 n.6.
"135. Hamilton, supra note 121, at 1066-68 (discussing original Texas statute with
narrow shield" of limited liability); id. at 1087-90 (discussing Minnesota and New York
statutes with broader shields of limited liability).
136. See Elisa Feldman, Comment, Your Partner's Keeper: The Duty of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 48 SMU L. REV. 1931, 1946
(1995). Insurance could mitigate, but not eliminate, this problem. Susan Saab Fortney,
Seeking Shelter in the Minefield of Unintended Consequences - The Traps of Limited
Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. RPv. 717, 729-30 (1997).
137. Professor Hamilton has characterized the move from a narrow to a broad shield
against liability as "gross overreaching by members of the legal profession." Hamilton,
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lar suggests to some that the forms fail to strike an appropriate balance
between private gain and social benefit. As Professors Bratton and Mc-
Cahery's Symposium contribution makes clear, at the very least we have
inadequate information upon which to base an extension of limited
liability. 38
In advising our hypothetical firm, we could undoubtedly agree on what
they should do, and even why they should do it, but there would be no
consensus as to why it is a good thing that these options are open to them.
There is no convincing underlying theory to justify having either LLPs or
LLCs, much less having them both. One commentator noted the con-
clusory nature of the underlying theory:
The ongoing revolution in small business structure is driven by the belief
that limited liability should be available to businesses without a tax
penalty. Some reformers are motivated by a perception that tort liability
is out of control; others are motivated by a perception that a corporate
level income tax is irrational. 1
39
These assumptions are flawed and hardly justify the multiplication of forms
we have seen over the last decade.
B. The Death of Uniformity: The Advent of RUPA
We have atomized the law of the unincorporated firm in a second way:
as to each form we have broken down statutory uniformity among the
states. A decade ago, the organizational laws for the unincorporated, multi-
person firm were remarkably uniform. Such is not the case today. Unifor-
mity has broken down as to the partnership form, and has never been
present with respect to the limited liability partnership and limited liability
company forms.
supra note 121, at 1090-91. Seemingly, nothing was expected. The debates of the various
state legislatures evidence a pattern of shockingly little debate on these substantial changes
in the law: "The argument that this broadening of limited liability is necessary to make the
shield of limited liability against malpractice claims 'more perfect' seems to me a pretext
for quietly obtaining limited liability for all partners in general partnerships without telling
the world about it." Id. at 1091.
138. Professors Bratton and McCahery's analysis calls into serious question the
economic efficiency justifications for the expansion of limited liability. William W. Bratton
& Joseph A. McCahery, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of the Limited Liability Company:
Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory Competition, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 629 (1997).
139. Dale A. Oesterle, Subcurrents in LLC Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of State
Courts to Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small Business, 66 U. CoLo. L. REv. 881, 881
(1995) (citation omitted).
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As to partnerships, from the time of the First World War until quite
recently, the law of general partnerships, in the United States was both
remarkably uniform" and essentially static. 41 In the late 1980s, the Amer-
ican Bar Association (ABA) and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) engaged in a project to revise the law
of general partnerships. The result of the revision effort was RUPA, which
was promulgated by NCCUSL and approved by the ABA in 1994.142 At
the time this is written, RUPA has been adopted in one form or another by
twelve states, but with substantial variations among the states. 43 This is a
significant breakdown in uniformity from the original UPA.lM
The treatment of fiduciary duties is nonuniform and illustrates the
complexity nonuniformity can introduce. Under the UPA-based regime, the
140. See 6 U.L.A. 128 (1995) (listing modifications of UPA by state).
.141. There was a robust debate at the time the original Uniform Partnership Act was
drafted. See William Draper Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L.J. 617, 638-41
(1915); see also 6 U.L.A. 126 (1995) (providing commentary on adoption process). Following
promulgation of the UPA by NCCUSL and adoption by almost all of the states, little revision
was undertaken for some sixty years. In the mid-1980s, Georgia undertook a fairly substantial
revision of the UPA as part of its adoption process. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-8-1 to -64 (1994
& Supp. 1996); Larry E. Ribstein, An Analysis of Georgia's New Partnership Law, 36
MERCERL. REv. 443, 447 (1985). Then, in 1987, an ABA committee issued a report recom-
mending a general revision of partnership law. Uniform Partnership Act Revision Subcomm.
of the Comm. on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Orgs., ABA Section of Corp.,
Banking, and Bus. Law, Should the Uniform Partnership Act Be Revised?, 43 Bus. LAW. 121,
124-27 (1987) [hereinafter ABA Revision Report]. With a 1988 article by the Reporter on the
NCCUSL UPA revision project, the revision effort began in earnest. See Donald J. Weidner,
A Perspective to Reconsider Partnership Law, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988).
142. The NCCUSL revision effort produced numerous drafts and three adopted texts.
Allan W. Vestal, A Comprehensive Uniform Limited Partnership Act? The Time Has Come,
28 U.C. DAvis L. Rsv. 1195, 1198 n.7 (1995) (listing RUPA drafts).
143. Two states, Montana and Wyoming, adopted the 1992 version of RUPA, not the
1994 version. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-10-101 to -710 (1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-21-
101 to -1003 (Michie, WESTLAW through 1996 Reg. Sess.). Before completion of the
NCCUSL drafting process, Texas adopted a revision of its partnership law only loosely based
on early RUPA drafts. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-1.01 to -10.04 (West Supp.
1997).
Even within the states that have adopted the 1994 version of RUPA, there are significant
variations from the uniform act. Compare RUPA, with ALA. CODE §§ 10-8A-101 to -1109
(Supp. 1996), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-1001 to -1111 (West Supp. 1996), CAL. CORP.
CODE §§ 16100-16962 (West Supp. 1997), An Act Concerning the Uniform Partnership Act,
1996 Conn. Legis. Serv., P.A. 95-341 (West), FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 620.8101 to .91 (West,
WFSTLAW through 1996 2d Reg. Sess.), N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-1A-101 to -1005 (Michie
1996), N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 45-13-01 to -22-27 (Supp. 1995), VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-73.79
to .149 (Michie 1996), W. VA. CODE §§ 47B-1-1 to -11-5 (1996).
144. 6 U.L.A. 128 (1995) (listing modifications by state).
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fiduciary duties of partners inter se were largely a matter of common law,
with the UPA supplementing the common-law treatment. 145 Under RUPA,
the obligations are changed in four important respects. First, RUPA makes
the obligations statutory and exclusive; the new regime attempts to displace
the common law on point."4  Second, within the statutory framework,
RUPA defines the obligations restrictively; it fails to include within the
fiduciary duty formulation one historically recognized obligation and
narrowly states the others. 47 Third, under RUPA, the obligations are
temporally limited; the statute eliminates the fiduciary protections during the
formation period."4 Finally, in the RUPA structure, the obligations are
broadly amendable; the partners are granted broad latitude to change their
obligations inter se.149
The problems of nonuniformity expand geometrically when one con-
siders the variations that enacting states have written into their adoptions of
RUPA on this point. In Texas, the statutory duties are apparently not
exclusive. 1"° In Florida, they are apparently intended to be statutory and
exclusive, but not narrowly defined.' 5' The California version weakens
both the exclusivity language and the narrow definition. 153 In Montana
145. See HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 147; Vestal, supra note 59, at 524-30.
146. See HiLLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 147-48; Vestal, supra note 59, at 532, 537-
45
147. See HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 148-54; Vestal, supra note 59, at 532-33,
545-55.
148. See HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 154-57; Vestal, supra note 59, at 534, 555-
56.
149. See HILLMAN Er AL., supra note 87, at 21-36, 157-58; Vestal, supra note 59, at 534,
556-63.
150. Compare TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-4.04(a) (West Supp. 1997)
("Duties. A partner owes to the partnership and the other partners: (1) a duty of loyalty; and
(2) a duty of care."), with RUPA § 404(a) ("The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the
partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in
subsections (b) and (c).").
151. Florida tracks RUPA in making the formulation of fiduciary duties statutory and
exclusive. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.8404(1) (West Supp. 1996) ("The only fiduciary duties a
partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of
care, as set forth in subsections (2) and (3)."). But then Florida leaves the definition of the
duty of loyalty open-ended. Compare id. § 620.8404(2) ("A partner's duty of loyalty to the
partnership and the other partners includes, without limitation, the following . . . ."), with
RUPA § 404(b) ("A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is
limited to the following. .. ").
152. The weakening in the definition of fiduciary duties from taking out the "only" in the
RUPA formulation might be argued to not be enough to make the California formulation non-
exclusive. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 16404(a) (West Supp. 1997) ("The fiduciary duties
a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty
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and Wyoming, the restrictions on amendment differ from those in RUPA. 14
And in Virginia, the restrictions on amendment of the fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care have been eliminated altogether."
As to limited liability partnerships, NCCUSL did not promulgate the
Uniform Limited Liability Partnership Act Amendments, which are a series
of amendments to RUPA, until 1996. Virtually every state had adopted a
limited liability partnership statute by that time, and thus the only hope for
uniformity within the limited liability partnership form is if states adopt the
NCCUSL Limited Liability Partnership Act Amendments as a second-
generation LLP statute, or if the states spontaneously move towards
uniformity. 6 Under the existing statutes, the problems of nonuniformity
are significant because the statutes differ in some fundamental respects. 17
As to limited liability companies, NCCUSL promulgated the Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) in 1995.111 Again, most states
had adopted limited liability company statutes by that time, and thus the
hope for uniformity within the limited liability company form is that states
will either adopt the NCCUSL Limited Liability Company Act as a second-
generation LLC statute, or spontaneously move towards uniformity.5 9
of care set forth in subdivisions (b) and (c)."), with RUPA § 404(a) ("The only fiduciary duties
a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty
of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c)."). But the legislative history supports the nonex-
clusive reading. HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 30-31 (California Supp. 1997).
153. The weakening within the definition of the duty of loyalty is much more significant
than the weakening in the definition of fiduciary duties and leads to the conclusion that the
California enactment is not intended to define the duty of loyalty exclusively. Compare CAL.
CORP. CODE § 16404(b) (West Supp. 1997) ("A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership
and the other partners includes all of the following . . . ."), with RUPA § 404(b) ("A partner's
duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is limited to the following . . ").
154. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-106(2)(c) (WESTLAW through 1995 Reg.
Sess.) (prohibition on elimination of duty of loyalty), id. § 35-10-405(3) (restrictions on
amendment of duty of loyalty), WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-21-103(b)(iii) (Michie, WESTLAW
through 1996 Reg. Sess.) (prohibition on elimination of duty of loyalty), and id. § 17-21-
404(c) (restrictions on amendment of duty of loyalty), with RUPA §§ 103, 404. The differ-
ences are due to these states having enacted the 1992 version of RUPA, not the final, 1994
version.
155. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.81.B (Michie 1996). Virginia did not change RUPA
restrictions on partner-agreement amendments of the nonfiduciary obligation of good faith and
fair dealing. Id. § 50-73.81.B.3.
156. See generally Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous
Uniformity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company, 34 ECON. INQUIRY
464 (1996).
157. Hamilton, supra note 121, at 1075-1102
158. ULLCA, 6A U.L.A. 425 (1995).
159. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 156, at 480-81.
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Is the atomization of unincorporated firm law through the death of
uniformity a problem? Uniformity has some obvious advantages. Uniform
laws for business organizations reinforce the notion that this is a national
society, not a balkanized collection of state economies. Uniformity reduces
search costs and all but eliminates the maneuvering of firm participants
seeking advantage through the choice of law.
Other than the argument that nonuniformity is desirable precisely
because it undermines the notion of a national society, there are arguments
that nonuniformity comes from beneficial experimentation and that non-
uniformity may be desirable if participants are able to adopt the state law
that gets them closest to their optimal bargain, thus reducing negotiation
costs. This claimed advantage must be weighed against the higher search
costs involved in identifying the best law and the possible uncertainty as to
whether the parties have the power to make a plenary choice of law."to
An interesting alternative analysis has recently been presented by
Professors Bruce Kobayashi and Larry Ribstein. Their analysis hails the
breakdown of uniformity as a positive development, suggesting that this
type of atomization of unincorporated firm law may be desirable over the
long term because uniformity will spontaneously emerge where uniformity
is efficient.'6 ' Reviewing the history of LLC statutes, Professors Kobayashi
and Ribstein present evidence "consistent with the hypothesis that unguided
evolution can achieve uniformity, and that such uniformity occurs when the
benefits of uniformity outweigh the costs of reduced variation and experi-
mentation." 62 Professors Kobayashi and Ribstein claim to "show that LLC
160. As to general partnerships under RUPA, if not LLPs under the ULLPAA or LLCs
under the ULLCA, there remains a question as to whether the parties have the power to
make a plenary choice of law election. See HuIMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 45-46; Allan
W. Vestal, Chwice of Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Partners Under the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act, 79 IOWA L. REv. 219, 244-46 (1995).
161. Professors Larry Ribstein and Bruce Kobayashi have presented their case for
spontaneous efficient uniformity and mounted their attack on NCCUSL in several venues.
See generally Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 156; Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H.
Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1996)
(hereinafter Ribstein & Kobayashi, Economic Analysis); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Unjform Laws, Model Laws and Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L.
REV. 947 (1995) (hereinafter Ribstein & Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws); Ribstein,
Theories, supra note 122. "Attack" is not too strong a characterization. Professors Ribstein
and Kobayashi have suggested "that at least some of NCCUSL's efforts should be discour-
aged and denied public funding and other support." Ribstein & Kobayashi, Uniform Laws,
Model Laws, supra, at 989. They conclude that: "Further study may reveal that NCCUSL
is a dinosaur whose day, if there ever was one, is past." Id.
162. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 156, at 466.
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statutory provisions moved toward desirable uniformity even in the absence
of a NCCUSL-sponsored proposal," 163 and that "LLC statutes already have
become uniform without NCCUSL's prodding on issues for which uniformity
is important." 1
64
Although the details of the Kobayashi and Ribstein argument, and the
means by which they test their theory, will be taken up in a different venue,
the underlying theory can be summarized as follows: The authors advance
"a positive theory of desirable and undesirable uniformity ... based on the
tradeoff between, on the one hand, uniformity's benefits of reducing informa-
tion costs, facilitating exchange and improving the allocation of resources,
and, on the other, diversity's benefits of increasing flexibility and promoting
experimentation and innovation." '6
Rather than evaluate the advantages of uniformity on a statute-by-statute
basis, the authors conclude that the information costs of diversity "vary
among different types of provisions." 11 Kobayashi and Ribstein state that
the difference in information costs between different statutory sections forms
"the basic insight for our test for appropriate uniformity."' 67 "Uniformity,"
the authors assert, "is relatively important for provisions affecting third-party
creditors who engage in small, non-recurring transactions with many firms,
where the creditors' marginal cost of learning an applicable provision likely
exceeds their marginal benefit."161 In contrast, they argue, "uniformity is
less important regarding provisions that affect the members themselves." 69
The authors parse the universe of statutory provisions found in the
limited liability company statutes in effect by 1994170 into three groups:
(i) provisions affecting third parties,' "where uniformity is likely to be
important;"'" (ii) provisions affecting members," where "uniformity is less
163. Ribstein & Kobayashi, Economic Analysis, supra note 161, at 186 (citing Koba-
yashi & Ribstein, supra note 156; Ribstein, Theories, supra note 122).
164. Ribstein & Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws, supra note 161, at 947-48
(citing Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 156).




169. Id. at 468-69. Kobayashi and Ribstein also consider the benefits of diversity. Id.
at 469.
170. Id. at 470, 474-75 (listing as tbl. n).
171. Id. at 474-75 (listing as tbl. H).
172. Id. at 468 n.18 (abbreviated listing); id. at 474-75 (comprehensive listing as tbl.
II).
173. Id. at 474-75 (listing as tbl. 11).
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important" and as to which "firms have less of an incentive to adopt uni-
form provisions;"174 and (iii) provisions"75 as to which owners 76 and lawyers
may have incentives to adopt uniform provisions which are not efficient."7
Kobayashi and Ribstein evaluate the uniformity of the forty-eight limited
liability company statutes and find "that large numbers of states have adopted
similar forms of many types of provisions," 7 evidence which "is consistent
with the hypothesis that the states, without the help of a uniform lawmaking
body, have recognized and attempted to reduce the costs of diversity by
adopting uniform default rules that reduce the transaction and information
costs of operating close corporations." '179 To determine whether such unifor-
mity is efficiency-producing, Kobayashi and Ribstein use the three classifica-
tions within the provision universe. The data support the authors' hypothesis
"that the average number of adoptions of the leading form will be smaller for
provisions affecting members than for provisions affecting either third parties
or the limited liability company's tax status."" s°
Beyond the critique of the details of the method by which the Kobayashi
and Ribstein theory is translated into testable form, which is for another
venue, Professors Kobayashi and Ribstein's analysis and conclusions are
fairly debatable on several levels. To start, Kobayashi and Ribstein's posi-
tive theory of desirable and undesirable uniformity is so narrowly stated that
it ignores a social value of interstate, intraform uniformity. The authors
allow uniformity the possible benefits of "reducing information costs, facili-
tating exchange and improving the allocation of resources," but do not
mention the potential social value of interstate, intraform uniformity on
noneconomic dimensions such as fiduciary duties.18 ' A common set of
fiduciary duties may have value by reaffirming behaviors that benefit the
society, such as the value of telling the truth."~ Quite apart from the eco-
nomic value of telling the truth when it reduces information costs, facilitates
174. Id. at 468-69.
175. Id. at 474-75 (listing as tbl. II).
176. Id. at 469.
177. Id. at 470.
178. Id. at 470-71.
179. Id. at 471.
180. Id. at 476.
181. Id. at 468.
182. Professor Marleen A. O'Connor has convincingly discussed the social importance
of language in the parallel context of corporate directors' fiduciary duties, drawing upon the
partnership experience. Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty?
Directors' Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALI's Principles of Corporate Gover-
nance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954, 962-82 (1993).
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exchange, and improves the allocation of resources, the society may deter-
mine that it wants participants in unincorporated firms to tell the truth even
when it is not demonstrably efficient for the participants in the short term
to do so. And the theory needs to meet the possibility that network exter-
nalities may lead to results that are socially suboptimal, albeit uniform, and
that contractual provisions cannot substitute for partnership law."
Further, Kobayashi and Ribstein narrow the scope of their asserted
benefits of uniformity and costs of diversity. Whereas they acknowledge
that uniformity has benefits, and presumably that diversity has costs, in
terms of "uniformity's benefits of reducing information costs, facilitating
exchange and improving the allocation of resources,""' the assertion that
the benefits and costs of diversity vary among different types of statutory
provisions is cast entirely in terms of information costs, not in terms of
otherwise facilitating exchange or improving the allocation of resources."
Having asserted the existence of desirable and undesirable uniformity
on the single dimension of information costs, the authors frame as the basic
183. This would parallel Professor Michael Klausner's work on the corporate side. See
generally Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. REv. 757 (1995). As to fiduciary duties, the model needs to address Professor Bill
Bratton's insights on the duty of loyalty. See William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the
Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law's Duty of Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW
139,_142-52 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
184. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 156, at 468.
185. Id. at 468. The authors note, but then finesse, the other values of uniformity:
"Economic analyses examining the benefits of uniformity have stressed the information and
other costs created by diversity. In particular, information costs are generated when parties
face a large number of statutory variations among jurisdictions." Id. Indeed, in another
analysis, the authors have identified six "benefits or cost-reducing attributes of uniform
laws." Ribstein & Kobayashi, Economic Analysis, supra note 161, at 137. These are: (1) a
reduction in "inconsistency costs" by exposing parties involved in multiple jurisdictions to
fewer sets of governance rules; (2) a reduction in "information costs" by making it easier
for parties involved in multiple jurisdictions to determine what statute applies and to predict
judicial interpretations of applicable statutes; (3) a reduction in "litigation costs" "by
trivializing otherwise difficult choice-of-law issues and eliminating deadweight litigation
costs involved in forum shopping"; (4) a reduction in "instability costs" as the uniform
regime establishes a momentum to resist statutory changes that would differentially affect
the parties to existing contracts; (5) a reduction in "externalities" when state legislators pass
legislation to aid constituents at the expense of nonconstituents, by giving legislators a
common solution to facilitate reciprocal fairness; and (6) a reduction in "drafting costs" by
allowing drafting agencies to hire experts and otherwise dedicating resources to improve the
quality of the legislative product. Id. at 137-40. Of the six potential benefits of uniform
legislation identified by the authors, only the information cost benefit is the subject of
analysis in the spontaneous efficient uniformity analysis. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note
156, at 468-69.
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insight for their test the assertion that information costs generated when
parties face a large number of statutory variations among jurisdictions "vary
among different types of provisions."" The insight is not just that infor-
mation costs (and thus the desirability of uniformity) vary among different
types of provisions. Such an insight would not be very remarkable. The
authors' insight is that such information costs and the associated desirability
of uniformity vary among different types of provisions in a predictable
pattern based on the party they see as being benefitted by the specific
provision. Under their analysis, "[u]niformity is relatively important for
provisions affecting third-party creditors who engage in small, non-recur-
ring transactions with many firms, where the creditors' marginal cost of
learning an applicable provision likely exceeds their marginal benefit,"'"
although "uniformity is less important regarding provisions that affect the
members [of the firm] themselves,' because "[t]he members of closely
held firms typically make relatively large investments in few firms and
therefore have relatively large marginal benefit and small marginal cost in
being informed about each provision." 89  "As a result," Kobayashi and
Ribstein conclude, "firms have less of an incentive to adopt uniform provi-
sions of this type" than do third-party creditors."9
This step of the Kobayashi and Ribstein argument is particularly
difficult to accept. As to third-party creditors, the language is imprecise:
"Uniformity is relatively important for provisions affecting third-party
creditors who engage in small, non-recurring transactions with many
firms .... ,"91 There are two possible interpretations of the language. If
the authors mean that all third-party creditors engage in small, nonrecurring
transactions with many firms, then they make an obviously unreasonable
186. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 156, at 468.
187. Id. at 468.
188. Id. at 468-69.
189. Id. at 469.
190. Id. The authors limit their analysis to the provisions of the LLC statutes.
Presumably, third-party creditors are more concerned about the uniformity of other statutory
provisions that more directly govern their transactions with the firm, such as the provisions
of UCC Articles 2 and 9, than they are with some of the provisions of the LLC statute
identified by the authors as third-party provisions, such as the provision for reservation of
a name or the definition of a foreign limited liability company. Id. at 474-75. Such third-
party creditors are also presumably more concerned about bodies of applicable law as to
which they can have an impact either by including a contractual choice of law provision or
by structuring the transaction to come to a favorable result under applicable choice of law
policy.
191. Id. at 468.
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assumption."9 If, on the other hand, the authors mean only that those
third-party creditors who engage in small, nonrecurring transactions with
many firms find uniformity relatively important as to provisions affecting
them," then the statement may or may not be true, but it certainly leaves
several presumably large classes of third-party creditors completely outside
of the analysis. These would at a minimum include third-party creditors
who engage in large transactions and third-party creditors who engage in
recurring transactions.
This assumption, flawed under either possible interpretation, is impor-
tant because it goes to the heart of the implementation of the authors' basic
insight: the division of the universe of limited liability statutory provisions
into those in which uniformity is efficient and those in which uniformity is
not efficient. That is because different types of third-party creditors pre-
sumably have different information costs; as to the entire universe of third-
party creditors it is not true that "[u]niformity is relatively important for
provisions affecting third-party creditors... where the creditors' marginal
cost of learning an applicable provision likely exceeds their marginal
benefit. " 194
Significant numbers of third-party creditors engage in small but recur-
ring transactions, in which the creditor's marginal benefit of learning an
applicable provision might well exceed the marginal cost over time.
Examples of this type of third-party creditor would be a food wholesaler
that services small, independent grocery store accounts and a plumbing firm
that subcontracts with a limited number of developers on residential con-
struction projects. Other third-party creditors engage in large transactions
in which the creditor's marginal benefit of learning an applicable provision
might well exceed the marginal cost on even a single-transaction basis.
Examples of this type of third-party creditor would be a vendor of complex
computer systems who offers financing and a financial institution that
engages in shopping center development lending. It is a reasonable assump-
tion that, however one defines "small" and "recurring," the number of
third-party creditors that fit into one of these two classifications - those
who engage in small but recurring transactions and those who engage in
192. Id. In this case, the intention of the authors would be something like: "Uniformity
is relatively important for provisions affecting third-party creditors[,] who engage in small
non-recurring transactions with many firms .... "
193. Id. In which case, the intention of the authors would be something like: "Unifor-
mity is relatively important for provisions affecting [those] third-party creditors who engage
in small, non-recurring transactions with many firms.. .
194. Id.
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large transactions - far exceeds the number of third-party creditors that
engage in small, nonrecurring transactions. And even third-party creditors
that engage in only small, nonrecurring transactions may find their informa-
tion cost is justified by the marginal benefit if the transactions are relatively
uniform and the "many firms" are located in a small number of jurisdic-
tions.
This step also seems troublesome as to the firm."9 Kobayashi and
Ribstein assert that because participants in closely held firms make rela-
tively large investments in few firms, their relatively large marginal benefit
and relatively small marginal cost of information make uniformity less
important in their calculation."9 It is not a quibble to observe that there is
no way of knowing what the participants' marginal information cost will be.
Given the opportunities for selection of any jurisdiction, the number of
searches will be high."9 And because the selection of applicable law in
this case governs the internal relations of the parties, we may assume that
the gathering of information will be an individual and not a firm effort, as
the participants jockey for advantage against each other in the choice of
law. 198 This, in turn, means that the information costs will be duplicated
between - not shared among - the firm participants.
An example demonstrates the fragility of the authors' assumptions.
Assume a $5,000,000 real estate development project, with the owner
organized as a member-managed limited liability company, in which the ten
members each contribute $50,000, and the $4,500,000 balance is financed
on a nonrecourse basis with a financial institution. In such a situation, it
195. Of course, the entire exercise seems somewhat out of touch with a world in which
a leading law firm does not have an expulsion clause in its partnership agreement. Beasley
v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL 438777, at *3 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996).
196. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 156, at 469. The authors state: "The members
of closely held firms typically make relatively large investments in few firms and therefore
have relatively large marginal benefit and small marginal cost in being informed about each
provision. As a result, firms have less of an incentive to adopt uniform provisions of this
type." Id.
197. There is an open question as to whether partners in a RUPA-based general
partnership have plenary power to make a choice of law election. HILLMAN ET AL., supra
note 87, at 41.46; Vestal, supra note 160, at 24346. As to LLPs, the question of whether
registration can override the otherwise applicable choice of law considerations is yet open,
although most statutes give up the issue by deferring to the registration. As to LLCs, the
participants are presumably free to choose.
198. Thus, the authors seem somewhat wide of the mark when they speak of the
incentive structure of the firm. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 156, at 469 ("As a result,
firms have less of an incentive to adopt uniform provisions of this type.") (emphasis added).
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seems quite odd to assume that the financial institution, with $4,500,000
plus interest, fees, and costs at risk, will find that its "marginal cost of
learning an applicable provision... exceeds... [its] marginal benefit,""9
while the ten members, each with $50,000 at risk, "have relatively large
marginal benefit and small marginal cost in being informed about each
provision" such that they would not favor uniform provisions.'
An initial review of the Kobayashi and Ribstein spontaneous efficient
uniformity model suggests that the assumptions upon which their model is
based are debatable and that their claims may be premature. We should not
on the basis of the Ribstein and Kobayashi analysis quickly abandon the
historical assumption that uniformity of the type brought about by the
participation of groups such as NCCUSL, the American Law Institute, and
the ABA is both economically efficient and socially beneficial.
C. The Shift to Contractarianism: The Move to Statutory Defaults
The third way in which we have atomized the law of the unincorpo-
rated firm is by permitting broader contractual modification of noneconomic
statutory provisions. A decade ago, the range of noneconomic outcomes
to which participants in the unincorporated firm could negotiate was fairly
narrow." Such is not necessarily the case today.
199. Id. at 468.
200. Id. at 469. Of course, this is not the most extreme example. See Commissioner
v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 302-03 (1983) (general partnership for real estate development in
which partners' initial equity contribution was $0 and partners' ultimate equity contribution
was $44,212 against nonrecourse financial institution financing of $1,851,500).
201. I acknowledge the significantly differing interpretations advanced on this score.
Compare Hynes, supra note 117, with Allan W. Vestal, Advancing the Search for Compro-
mise: A Response to Professor Hynes, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 55 (Spring 1995).
I also note Professor Ribstein's latest comment on point, in his symposium paper. Larry
E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
537, 562 n.118 (1997). Professor Ribstein characterizes Dean Donald Weidner and me as
"anticontractarians" who "have made conclusory arguments that the law does not permit
such waivers [contracting out of fiduciary duties] while citing few, if any, supporting cases."
Id. at 570. Dean Weidner is chided for citing no cases. Id. I am charged with citing only
"three cases, none of which involves a fiduciary duty waiver." Id.
Dean Weidner can capably defend his own work, but I would note that the referenced
portion of his article cites two cases that stand for the proposition that, under the UPA,
fiduciary duties are not waiveable generally. Donald J. Weidner, RUPA and Fiduciary
Duty: The Texture of Relationship, 58 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 81, 91 (Spring 1995)
(citing Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 1991); Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d
304, 313 (111. App. Ct. 1989)).
As to Professor Ribstein's claim that none of the cases I cite involve fiduciary duty
waivers, in my article cited by Professor Ribstein, I cite three cases for the proposition that
THE MESS WE HAVE MADE OF PARTNERSHIP LAW 529
"case authority rejects the notion that partners exist in a contractarian state of grace as to
fiduciary duties under the UPA." Vestal, supra, at 58-60 n.17 (citing Saballus v. Timke,
460 N.E.2d 755 (111. App. Ct. 1983); Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 310 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989); Appletree Square I Ltd. Partnership v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 889, 893
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993)). Professor Ribstein's analysis of Appletree Square is not supported
by a close reading of the case. See Appletree Square, 494 N.W.2d at 893. Having
established that the common-law and statutory duties of disclosure co-exist in UPA-adopting
jurisdictions, the Appletree Square court turned to the question of whether "the parties
limited their duties of disclosure in their contract." Id. In response to that question the
court stated:
Partners may change their common law and statutory duties by incorporating
such changes in their partnership agreement .... However, where the major
purpose of a contract clause is to shield wrongdoers from liability, the clause will
be set aside as against public policy .... Additionally, while "partners are free
to vary many aspects of their relationship . . . they are not free to destroy its
fiduciary character."
To hold that partners may replace their broad duty of disclosure with a
narrow duty to render information upon demand would destroy the fiduciary
character of their relationship ....
Id. Professor Ribstein summarizes the court's holding as: "The court reasoned that a
contract provision which relieved the defendant of the duty to disclose was against public
policy in this setting where its major purpose was to shield wrongdoers from liability."
Ribstein, supra, at 576. This is at best incomplete, because it ignores the "additionally"
clause in the holding which specifically relates to a broad-form waiver of the fiduciary duty
to disclose. Professor Ribstein's observation that, "[n]otably . . .the agreement did not
waive the defendant's disclosure duty, but rather stated an affirmative obligation to dis-
close," id., is remarkable; at issue was whether the contractual provision waived the
common-law duty to disqlose. Appletree, 494 N.W.2d at 893. In Labovitz, the court
correctly decided that a broad delegation of authority did not carry with it a broad-form
waiver of fiduciary duties. Labovitz, 545 N.E.2d at 310. The court observed that such
fiduciary duties do not depend on expression in the partnership agreement and cited Saballus
for the proposition "that although 'partners are free to vary many aspects of their relation-
ship inter se, . . . they are not free to destroy its fiduciary character.'" Id. Professor
Ribstein notes that "[tihis is different from saying that the partners may not contract to
enforce fiduciary obligations other than through legal fiduciary duties and remedies."
Ribstein, supra, at 579. Of course, the Labovitz court also observed that: "Defendants cite
no authority, and we find none, for the proposition that there can be an a priori waiver of
fiduciary duties in a partnership - be it general or limited." Labovitz, 545 N.E.2d at 313.
Finally, Professor Ribstein's own treatise is at odds with his pronouncement that "this
contractual view of fiduciary duties is, in fact, nearly universally accepted by state statutes
and the courts." Ribstein, supra, at 570. Ribstein stated that:
Although a partner may retain a benefit where the other partners consented
to the particular transaction or the agreement permitted a certain type of co-
partner profit, an across-the-board waiver presents a more serious question.
Because the fiduciary duty among the partners is so basic a part of the partner-
ship standard form, a court may interpret an across-the-board waiver strictly and
apply even a clear waiver cautiously.
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With respect to general partnerships, RUPA overall adopts a much more
contractarian orientation than does the UPA, although the transition is
imperfect.' The fiduciary duties owed partners illustrate the trend. It
seems clear that the fiduciary duties of partners under the UPA and the
common law are matters essentially of status and not of agreement, of tort
and not of contract. Simply by virtue of being a partner, one owes the other
partners and the partnership certain duties. And, except for narrow and
specific waivers following full disclosure, those status-based fiduciary duties
are not amendable by the parties. This is the best analysis of the historical
state of the law,') notwithstanding Professor Hynes's interpretation of
Singer 4 and Riviera, I and Professor Ribstein's desire that it not be so.2
There is some authority for nonenforcement or incomplete enforcement of
such waivers in the corporate and limited partnership contexts.
Despite the corporate and limited partnership authority hostile to broad
waivers of fiduciary duty, such waivers should arguably be enforced in a general
partnership where there is direct and equal dealing between the partners and co-
management power, at least where the waiver is explicit and there are no equita-
ble reasons for nonenforcement in the given case.
2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP
§ 6.07, at 6:91-6:92 (1994) (citations omitted). That courts arguably should enforce broad-
form waivers when there is direct and equal dealing, comanagement power, and an explicit
waiver, and no equitable reasons for nonenforcement is hardly universal acceptance of the
contractual view of fiduciary duties. Vestal, supra, at 58-60 n.16.
202. Vestal, supra note 201, at 57-70 (comparing UPA and RUPA fiduciary regimes).
The failure to make the fiduciary regime fully contractarian has been lamented by cornmen-
"tators of that persuasion. Ribstein, supra note 117, at 51, 57-61. And the contractarian
failure is not isolated to the fiduciary duty sections; it is conspicuous in the information
disclosure provisions of RUPA. See generally Vestal, supra note 100.
203. Vestal, supra note 201, at 58 n.16.
204. Professor Hynes interprets Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981),
decided under the UPA and the common-law regime, as permitting the complete elimination
of the duty of loyalty, a result he thinks could not be reached under RUPA. Hynes, supra
note 117, at 42. I believe he reads the case incorrectly, and that it is not at all clear that
the result reached in Singer under the UPA and the common-law regime could not be
reached under RUPA. Vestal, supra note 201, at 57 n.11. Dean Weidner reaches the same
result. Weidner, supra note 201, at 92-93.
205. Professor Hynes interprets Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 223 N.E.2d 876
(N.Y. 1966), decided under the UPA and the common-law regime, as enforcing a provision
that might be found manifestly unreasonable and thus not enforceable under RUPA. Hynes,
supra note 117, at 43. I think his prediction is wrong, based on the overall tenor and tone
of the opinion. Vestal, supra note 201, at 57 n.11. Dean Weidner reaches the same result.
Weidner, supra note 201, at 91-92.
206. Vestal, supra note 201, at 58 n.16. In that discussion, I trace the treatment
of fiduciary duties in the present regime in Professor Ribstein's treatise. Although the
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The details of fiduciary duties under RUPA are not perfectly clear, but
the well-established outlines show us a range of fiduciary duties that starts
out as statutory and exclusive,' restrictively defined' s and temporally
limited,2 and is then broadly amendable.2 10 The precise range of options to
authors characterize the UPA as a "'standard form' contract, which controls the rights
and duties among the partners in the absence of contrary agreement," 2 BROMBERG & RIB-
SrEIN, supra note 201, § 6.01, at 6:2, thus inviting the inference that such duties are fully
amendable, they do acknowledge that "[tihe partners, among themselves, are fiduciaries,"
id. § 6.07, at 6:67, and that "specific duties and restrictions . . . are imposed on the
partners by reason of the fiduciary nature of their relationship," id. § 6.07, at 6:67-6:68.
On the question of whether such fiduciary duties may be waived or otherwise modified
by contract, the tone of the treatment is contractarian: "Fiduciary duties are essentially part
of the standard form contract that governs partnerships in the absence of contrary agree-
ment." Id. § 6.07, at 6:68. But other than a discussion of the UPA Section 21 duty
to account, which is, by its terms subject to modification by the agreement of the partners,
the treatment is equivocal. It starts with some contractarian overstatement: "Partner
fiduciary duties are aspects of the 'standard form' of partnership. As with respect to the
other rights and duties among the partners, the partners may alter the standard form
fiduciary duties to suit their particular relationship." Id. § 6.07, at 6:89. Then comes the
tighter, more careful analysis:
Although a partner may retain a benefit where the other partners consented
to the particular transaction or the agreement permitted a certain type of co-
partner profit, an across-the-board waiver presents a more serious question.
Because the fiduciary duty among the partners is so basic a part of the partner-
ship standard form, a court may interpret an across-the-board waiver strictly and
apply even a clear waiver cautiously.
There is some authority for nonenforcement or incomplete enforcement of
such waivers in the corporate and limited partnership contexts.
Despite the corporate and limited partnership authority hostile to broad
waivers of fiduciary duty, such waivers should arguably be enforced in a general
partnership where there is direct and equal dealing between the partners and co-
management power, at least where the waiver is explicit and there are no equita-
ble reasons for nonenforcement in the given case.
Id. § 6.07, at 6:91-6:92 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). That such general modifica-
tions "should arguably be enforced" is an argument from policy, not precedent - and a
pretty weak one at that when limited to situations in which there is an explicit waiver that
is the product of direct and equal dealing between partners with comanagement power and
in which there are no equitable reasons for nonenforcement.
207. HLLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 147-48; Vestal, supra note 59, at 532, 537-45.
208. HaimAN Er AL., supra note 87, at 148-54; Vestal, supra note 59, at 532-33, 545-
55.
209. HmLmAN ETAL., supra note 87, at 154-57; Vestal, supra note 59, at 534, 555-56.
210. HMImAN ErAL., supra note 87, at 23-27, 157-58; Vestal, supra note 59, at 534,
556-63.
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which the partners may bargain is not well settled, but the power certainly
is broad.2
As to the other forms, there is some confusion and a great deal of
latitude concerning the contours of fiduciary duties. With respect to limited
partnerships, the situation is somewhat unclear because it is not well settled
how RUPA will interconnect with limited partnerships,212 leaving room for
confusion as to whether limited partnerships will be subject to the UPA and
common-law fiduciary duty formulation, or RUPA. With respect to limited
liability partnerships, the degree of contractarian influence is dependent on
the partnership statute from which the limited liability partnership regime
departs. Those based on the UPA retain traditional limits on participant
modifications of the statutory terms; those based on RUPA adopt a more
contractarian approach.23 The ULLPAA adopts the RUPA fiduciary duty
211. Much of the confusion arises from the formulation of RUPA Section 103(b)(3),
which is an exception to the default rule that gives primacy to the partnership agreement
over the statute on matters of internal organization:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), relations among the partners and
between the partners and the partnership are governed by the partnership agree-
ment. To the extent the partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, this
[Act]. governs relations among the partners and between the partners and the
partnership.
RUPA § 103(a). The exception as to fiduciary rules provides:
The partnership agreement may not:
(3) eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 404(b) or 603(b)(3), but:
(i) the partnership agreement may identify specific types or categories of
activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable;
or
(U') all of the partners or a number or percentage specified in the partnership
agreement may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a
specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty.
RUPA § 103(b)(3). The meaning of this exception is rather unclear. See HILLMAN ET AL.,
supra note 87, at 23-27; Hynes, supra note 117, at 39-41; Vestal, supra note 201, at 61-70.
212. HiLLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 5-9, 56-58; Vestal, supra note 142.
213. Virginia illustrates both approaches. The Commonwealth has a UPA-based LLP
mechanism. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-43.1 to -43.12 (Michie 1996). It also has a RUPA-
based LLP mechanism. Id. §§ 50-73.132 to -73.143. The former applies to LLPs formed
prior to July 1, 1997 that do not opt into the new regime, until the retroactive application
of the new statute to all partnerships, in 2002. Id. § 50-73.147. LLPs under the old regime
are subject to UPA-based and common-law fiduciary duties. Compare UPA § 19 (books),
id. § 20 (render information), id. § 21 (account as fiduciary), and id. § 22 (right to account-
ing), with VA. CODE ANN. § 50.19 (books), id. § 50.20 (render information), id. § 50.21
(account as fiduciary), and id. § 50.22 (right to accounting). LLPs under the new regime
are subject to RUPA-based fiduciary duties, subject to Virginia's underlying modifications
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formulation without modification,214 together with the RUPA restrictions on
partner-agreement modifications of the fiduciary duty provisions.215
With respect to limited liability companies, the trend is certainly
toward a more contractarian approach. The fiduciary duty and modification
provisions of the ULLCA follow those of RUPA, with the exception of
members in manager-managed LLCs that are not also managers, who have
no fiduciary obligations to the firm.216
The academic proponents of atomization and, to the extent that they
have any thoughts of the underlying policy, the legislators who have en-
acted RUPA and the LLP and LLC enabling statutes, seem to be proceed-
ing from the assumptions that multiplicity of forms is not harmful, that
intraform uniformity is not desirable, and that the extension of limited lia-
bility to the members of unincorporated firms is a positive good. The
haphazard atomization of partnership law is the direct result of those flawed
assumptions.
of the RUPA duties. Compare RUPA § 103(b), with VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.81.B.
214. Compare ULLPAA § 404, with RUPA § 404.
215. Compare ULLPAA § 103(b)(3)-(4), with RUPA § 103(b)(3)-(4). Neither does
the ULLPAA change the nonfiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing from the
RUPA formulation. Compare ULLPAA § 404(d), with RUPA § 404(d), and ULLPAA
§ 103(b)(5), with RUPA § 103(b)(5).
216. The fiduciary duty provisions of the ULLCA parallel those of RUPA, with one
qualification. The ULLCA differentiates between two types of LLCs; those that are
"member-managed," in which the statutory default is that each member has equal rights in
management, ULLCA § 404(a), and those that are "manager-managed," in which the right
to manage the company is vested in the managers. ULLCA § 404(b). The managers may
be members, but need not be such. ULLCA § 101(9). The statute does provide for a list
of actions as to which consent of all the members is required. ULLCA § 404(c). The
fiduciary obligations of managers in manager-managed LLCs, and of members in member-
managed LLCs are similar to those of partners under RUPA. In a member-managed LLC,
the provisions are parallel. Compare ULLCA § 409(a)-(g), with RUPA § 404(a)-(g). In
a manager-managed LLC, the duties of the manager are intended to be parallel. ULLCA
§ 409(h)(2) (noting that "a manager is held to the same standards of conduct prescribed for
members in subsections [409] (b) through (f)"). An interesting question is whether the
fiduciary duties of a manager in a manager-managed LLC are broader than those of a
member in a member-managed LLC by virtue of the fact that, under ULLCA Section
409(h)(2), the common-law displacement language of Section 409(a) does not apply to the
manager. This is clearly not the intention of the drafters. See ULLCA § 409 cmt. As to
members in manager-managed LLCs, the rule is different: "[A] member who is not also a
manager owes no duties to the company or to the other members solely by reason of being
a member." ULLCA § 409(h)(1).
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Conclusion
An ethicist, a political scientist, and an economist were stranded on
a desert island. They had no food or water, no means of transportation
or communication. Sitting on the beach, they pondered their fate. The
ethicist declared that it would be acceptable for them to eat one of their
number if that would enable the others to live. The political scientist
suggested that they vote on whether to eat one of their number, and if so,
who. The economist laughed and announced that she had a way to get
them off the island without having to eat anybody. She cleared her throat
and began: "First, assume a rather large boat .... "217
The assumptions we make in this debate matter. At best, they shape
the debate over significant policy changes. At worst, when there is inade-
quate debate, our assumptions substitute for analysis and lead unexamined
to undesirable and erroneous conclusions. My hope is that this Symposium
will advance the process by which we examine the assumptions of both the
advocates and opponents of change, and thereby help us chart a different
and better path for the evolution of the law.
The UPA and common-law regime of partnership law is based on
assumptions about the nature of collective enterprise, the importance of
personal responsibility, and the desirability of uniform laws. These as-
sumptions too often have been unarticulated and, as Professor Mitchell
correctly observes, too rarely defended in all their richness.
The RUPA, LLP, and LLC regimes are based on assumptions about
the conflict between economic and social goals and the primacy of the
former, the desirability of broad contractual powers to reach efficient
results as to noneconomic terms, the efficiency effects of limited liability,
and, lately, the acceptability of nonuniformity - not as an inefficient cost
of freedom of contract or as a prerequisite for an efficient market in part-
nership law, but rather as an evolutionary stage on the path to spontaneous,
efficient uniformity.
We need to re-examine these assumptions and to see if we can achieve
some consensus on the new directions in the law of the unincorporated firm
to replace the abandoned historical consensus. Professor Mitchell's work
on the compatibility of fiduciary rules and economic efficiency is helpful
in this regard, as is Professors Bratton and McCahery's work on limited
217. A very old academic joke, told in many forms, but with economists almost always
taking the hit. I do not mean to so limit the observation here. Although I take issue with
the assumptions built into the model presented by Professors Ribstein and Kobayashi, I am
also troubled by the various assumptions adopted by the noneconomics-based commentators
in the field.
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liability and economic efficiency. It is not going to be an easy task, given
how far out in front of any compelling theoretical justification the enacting
jurisdictions have gotten. But the mess we have made of partnership law
is a sufficient reason to attempt the task.
Or perhaps we should just let the chaos go unchallenged and see if any
order comes from the present disorder. This path has some attraction, if
for no other reason than that some of the actors seem to get what they
deserve - or almost. Remember John Fritts, the co-chair of Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft's management committee? As if to confirm his asser-
tion that "life ... is made up of fear, greed and money,""' it is reported
that the insurgents at Cadwalader who maneuvered for the wrongful ouster
of James Beasley, also were maneuvering for the removal of John Fritts
from the management committee:
According to a Cadwalader memo selectively circulated in the firm
in late 1993, a band of 40-something partners that one partner dubbed
"The Good Guys" aimed to rid the management committee of the "over-
paid" and "underproductive," replacing them with partners "willing to
lead by example." Within a year, according to papers, they drew up
plans to shed one-fifth of Cadwalader's partners, about 20, and award
$1.2 million in bonuses to 20 other profitable partners. The insurgents
dubbed this plan "Project Rightsize."
The memo advises care in pushing John F. Fritts off the manage-
ment committee: "Treat him as unfortunate victim of upheaval, that
removal is not a negative reflection on him personally. "219
Fritts apparently outmaneuvered the insurgents; he remains to this day on
the management committee of the partnership.' But with the mess we
have made of partnership law, it must be an increasingly uneasy perch.
218. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ," 1996 WL
438777, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996) (quoting deposition of John Fritts at 95, 11. 10-
25, docket no. 132).
219. See Davis, supra note 75, at A6.
220. Id.

